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1.  A Man’s Ideas
Legal progress is often propelled by concepts first envisioned in academia. 
In this light, the present article explores the ideas of a fascinating intellectual 
figure: Francisco de Vitoria (1483-1546),1 a man broadly recognized as one 
of the “founding fathers” of international law. The writings and lectures of 
this 16th century Dominican friar formulated innovative legal doctrines in 
an age of uncertainty and profound social change; an age that gave birth to 
the modern States that, with their centralized power, signalled the demise of 
medieval pluralism, the dismemberment of Christendom, and the erosion 
of imperial and papal aspirations to universal power. 
Medieval Europe, before then, had defined itself as a cultural, political 
and religious unity: the Res Publica Christiana. The first half of the 16th 
century witnessed the final breakdown of that order, the emergence of the 
modern sovereign state and the subsequent development of the European 
state system. It was also in this age that a singular event transformed con-
ventional conceptions of the world and consolidated anthropocentrism: the 
discovery of America.2 A ‘stellar moment’ of literature, political and legal 
*  For correspondence use pablo.zapatero@uc3m.es. Unless otherwise indicated, translations 
in this paper are by the author.
1) See Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr. Francisco de Vitoria: Su vida, su doctrina e influencia, 
Imprenta Católica, 1930 and de Heredia, Beltrán. Francisco de Vitoria, Editorial Labor, 1939.
2) Pérez Luño, A. La polémica sobre el Nuevo Mundo. Los clásicos españoles de la Filosofía del 
Derecho, 1992, p. 17.
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thought took place in the Iberian Peninsula: the golden age of Spain. One 
of the most innovative intellectual movements of that period, the so-called 
School of Salamanca, was formed under that aegis.3 This Doctrinal movement 
sparked a profound renewal of Spanish Scholastic thought.4 
Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto and Francisco Suarez are the 
foremost representatives of this Seconda Scolastica. Their collective effort 
produced, in essence, a “revamped Scholasticism”, different from that of the 
early Middle Ages which evokes, to paraphrase Truyol, a preoccupation with 
trivial distinctions, classifications and the “inflation of abstraction” at the 
expense of reality.5 To the contrary, Vitoria and his colleagues developed and 
disseminated new ideas by guiding and nurturing this academic current with 
a characteristically direct concern and contact with the issues of the time.6
Three basic dimensions are interrelated in the work of Francisco de 
Vitoria: theology, political power, and the Law of Peoples. To summarize, 
he adopted a stance typical of classical Natural Law theorists,7 addressing 
the major issues of his time by reconciling philosophy and theology on 
the basis of Christian morality and Natural Law. His ideas are rooted in 
Thomist and Nominalist doctrines, and exude Catholic influence. Vitoria 
maintained that there was no contention, issue or dispute that did not fall 
within the bounds of Theology.8 This broad conception of theology allowed 
him to examine a wide range of social issues, which he approached with 
independent criteria and a critical sense. For this reason, he has occasion-
ally been described as a “theologian confronting power.”9 Some of his key 
3) For the manuscripts of 21 theologians from this group see Ehrle, F. Los manuscritos 
vaticanos de los teólogos salmantinos del Siglo XVI, Biblioteca de Estudios Eclesiásticos, 1930.
4) Truyol, A. “Vitoria et la tradition scolastique”, Aspects de la pensée médiévale dans la 
philosophie politique moderne, Edition by Y.Ch. Zarka, Paris, 1999, pp. 70-82.
5) Truyol, A. “Vitoria et la tradition scolastique” … op. cit. pp. 70-71.
6) See Hamilton, B. Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain: A Study of the Political 
Ideas of Vitoria, De Soto, Suárez, and Molina, Oxford, 1963.
7) Pérez Luño, A. La polémica … op. cit.
8) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili”, Obras de Francisco de Vitoria. Relecciones Teológicas, an-
notated edition by Teófilo Urdanoz, Madrid, 1960, p. 150. See Langella Sichenz, S. “Apuntes 
sobre el concepto de teología en Francisco de Vitoria, 30 Cuadernos salmantinos de filosofía 
(2003): 277-290.
9) Carrillo Salcedo, J.A. “Aportaciones de Francisco de Vitoria a los fundamentos filosóficos 
de los derechos humanos”, La Escuela de Salamanca y el Derecho Internacional en América. 
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theses bear witness to that relation. In fact, his ideas drew the attention of 
Charles V himself, who was deeply displeased that doctrines contrary to his 
interests were being taught at the University of Salamanca.
Francisco de Vitoria is recognized today as one of the main intellectual 
founders of international law, along with later thinkers such as Alberico 
Gentili (1552-1608) and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645).10 However, when mod-
ern academic literature began to pay attention to this subject, the credit 
was originally given solely to Grotius, although he himself used the words 
of the blackfriar (Vitoria) extensively to develop his famous legal brief for 
the Dutch East India Company; and these ideas would later figure in his 
anonymously published Mare Liberum. Nonetheless, at the beginning of 
19th century, Vitoria was mentioned only for his contributions to the re-
newal of Scholasticism. Academic interest reawakened with Mackintosh’s 
“rediscovery” of the universalist aspect of his work in 1816. Later, the issue 
was addressed in works by Alvarez de los Corrales (1859), Ernest Nys (1894), 
Barthelemy (1904), J. Brown Scott (1928) and other scholars.11 
However, Scott is the scholar who has had the greatest influence in cit-
ing the importance of the blackfriar to the development of the discipline 
of international law. In his words: “Francisco de Vitoria […] has long been 
known as a theologian, a moralist, and a humanist; today his reputation 
is that of a jurist and philosopher as well; tomorrow it will be that of an 
internationalist and a humanitarian; and many believe that he is destined to 
be regarded as the founder of the modern Law of Nations.”12 In any case, the 
“battle over the founders of international law”, using Peter Haggenmacher’s 
expression,13 is still being fought today in many forms and for many reasons. 
But first, let us briefly focus on the intellectual figure of the man.
Vitoria was a highly recognized professor, yet he never committed a 
text to print. He certainly had every opportunity to publish and in fact 
Del pasado al futuro. (Araceli Mangas Martín, Ed.), Salamanca, 1993, p. 52.
10) Truyol, A. “Grotius dans ses rapports ave les classiques espagnols du droit des gens”, 182 
Recueil des Cours (1984): 431-451. 
11) For a fine study on this process see Haggenmacher, P. “La place de Francisco de Vitoria 
parmi les fondateurs du droit International”, Actualité de la pensée juridique de Francisco de 
Vitoria, Bruylant, 1998, p. 27-36.
12) Scott, J. Brown The Spanish Origins of International Law: Francisco de Vitoria and his 
Law of Nations, 1934, p. 68.
13) Haggenmacher, P. “La place de Francisco de Vitoria … op. cit. p. 35.
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advocated for the purchase of one of the first university presses in Spain. 
The reason for his lack of publication was perhaps not that he was focused 
more on teaching but rather that his new ideas would be better served in 
the minds of his students, pupils and disciples than exposed in published 
texts subject to the surgery of expurgation. Fortunately, some of his reflec-
tions have been preserved in his manuscripts and some through verbatim 
notes taken in class by his students. This confirms that Vitoria’s intellectual 
creations were directly linked to his teaching activities, and are therefore 
found in the texts prepared for his classes (Lectios) and in the traditional 
end-of-term special lectures (Relectios) presented to the whole university 
community at Salamanca. 
These texts, together with his Commentary on the Summa Theologiae 
of Thomas Aquinas, give an accurate intellectual portrait of the man; but 
the most distilled expression of that intellectual activity is clearly found 
in the Relectios. Of these, three are especially relevant to the history of 
ideas: De potestate civili (On Civil Power, 1528), De Indis recenter investis 
(On the Indians Recently Discovered, 1539) and De Indis sive de Iure Belli 
hispanorum in Barbaros (On the Indians, or on the Law of War made by 
Spanish on the Barbarians, 1539). These conferences constitute one of the 
most far-reaching positions taken in that age concerning political power 
and relations amongst peoples.14 
Vitoria’s main ideas about political power are found in De potestate civili. 
This relectio may be considered, with due historical caution, as an embry-
onic Theory of the State.15 For the Dominican, all human groups need an 
authority responsible for pursuing the common good. To that end, God 
has conferred political power to the res publica (political community) that 
results from man’s social nature.16 Therefore, that power ultimately resides 
in the political community: “since by natural and divine law is granted the 
power to govern the res publica and, apart from positive and human law, 
there is no special reason why that power should reside more in one than 
14) Truyol, A. “Razón de Estado y derecho de gentes en tiempo de Carlos V”, Karl V. Der 
Kaisser und seine Zeit, Böhlaw Verlag, 1960, p. 205.
15) See Gómez Robledo, A. Fundadores del Derecho Internacional, México, 1989, p. 30 and 
Truyol, A. “Razón de Estado … ”, p. 205.
16) Vitoria asserted the natural origin of society vis-à-vis contractualist theses as other Spanish 
philosophers of the XVI century. See Hamilton, B. Political Thought … op. cit. pp. 30-58.
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in the other, it is necessary for the community itself to suffice and to have 
the power to govern itself ”.17 
Nonetheless, for Vitoria, the power of the monarch and that of the 
political community are not exclusive: political power resides in the res 
publica while its exercise is vested in the monarch; the administration of 
power, or government, is conferred upon the ruler by the res publica. Thus 
the Dominican ascribed a popular foundation for the monarch’s power and 
likewise maintained that such power is limited by the mandates of divine, 
natural and positive law. Concerning the last, he made this observation: 
“civil laws are binding on legislators and principally on kings”, so that “a 
legislator who does not obey his own laws wrongs the res publica and all 
other citizens”. In short, “although the laws be issued by the king, they are 
equally binding upon the king himself ”.18 
In this regard, Vitoria’s theses differ from the principle princeps a legibus 
solutus est in Hobbes’ Leviathan (1651), which the emerging states of the era 
sought to elevate. Whereas the friar maintained, like Hobbes, that it was 
the political community that should decide its government, he expressed 
a preference for, among the various forms of government, non-absolutist 
monarchy, an inclination that did not, however, prevent him from reserv-
ing certain decisions for the political community as a whole. Thus he made 
references to the majority principle for the appointment of rulers: “a res 
publica can appoint any one it will to be its lord, and therefore the consent 
of all is not necessary, but the consent of the majority suffices. For… in 
matters concerning the good of the res publica the decisions of the majority 
are binding even when the rest are of a contrary mind”.19 
Vitoria also reflected on the advisability in such cases of following the 
majority principle: if unanimity were to be required, the political commu-
nity would not be adequately served, since it is rare and almost impossible 
to achieve, given the numbers of people involved. Thus it suffices for the 
majority to decide on something for it to be carried out lawfully”.20 It may 
therefore be deduced that the political community is entitled to select its 
own government, with the injunction that, once this initial choice has been 
17) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili, proposition 7”, in Obras … op. cit.
18) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili, proposition 21”, in Obras … op. cit.
19) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, de tit leg, proposition 16”, in Obras … op. cit.
20) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili, proposition 14”, in Obras … 
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made, that government must be obeyed. As a result, the thesis offers new 
justifications for obedience to the law: power has its natural basis (albeit 
indirectly) in the political community itself.21 In short, the friar addressed 
a variety of challenging political issues. 
2.  The Res Publica of All the World
Vitoria thought of the political community not only in individual local 
terms. His ideas integrate the res publica within a wider community of in-
dependent entities that together make up the entire globe and are subject 
to the rights and obligations deriving from the Law of Peoples. By virtue 
of this external dimension in his concept of political power, he could as-
sert that the different political communities of the Orb constitute a single 
entity: Totus Orbis. This thesis diverges from the idea of a global political 
community ruled by Emperors or Popes and leans instead towards an order 
of communities as subjects who relate to each other horizontally, not on 
the basis of hierarchy. 
Although Vitoria did not propose a particular mode of institutionaliza-
tion for these ideas, there is nonetheless a strong connection between his 
conceptions of the Orb and the res publica: “Totus orbis, qui aliquo modo est 
una res publica”.22 The Totus Orbis is conceived as a universal community 
of all peoples, extending to non-Christian political communities and reach-
ing beyond the closed context of medieval Christendom and its idea of a 
community of European Christian kingdoms.23 
In facing the issue of the Spanish conquest of the Indies, Vitoria 
maintained that no legitimacy could be derived from divine, natural or 
even positive law that would allow the Emperor Charles V to extend his 
sovereignty to other peoples. As the Indians were the original and true 
legitimate owners and lords of their land before the arrival of the Spanish, 
21) For a commentary on Vitoria and Machiavelli’s different approaches to the phenomenon 
of political community see the study by Truyol, A. “Razón … op. cit. 
22) On the parallelism see Barthelemy, J. “Francois de Vitoria”, Les fondateurs du Droit 
international, A. Pillet (ed), 1904, p. 7 and Truyol, A. “El Derecho de Gentes como orden 
universal”, in La Escuela de Salamanca … op. cit., p. 24.
23) On the issue of international subjectivity, commenting the relevance of Wolff and Vattel 
in this regard see Haggenmacher, P. “L’État souverain comme sujet de droit international, de 
Vitoria à Vattel”, 16 Droits 11 (1992): 20.
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in his opinion, “legal claims of title to their lands in favour of the Spanish 
monarchy have no more value than any title that they [the Indians] might 
have claimed had it been they who had discovered us [the Spanish]”.24 He 
held a similar position with regard to the Pope, who had no rightful power, 
beyond that of a strictly spiritual nature, over the Orb or any of its states. 
Thus he rejected the ideas of hierarchy and submission to the great pow-
ers pervasive in the res publica at the close of the Middle Ages. In sum, no 
power - be it papal or imperial - could claim universal authority. 
Once questioning the status quo, he went further and outlined an alter-
native: a community of peoples encompassing the whole world. This is a 
striking seminal vision of the ideas of a “world political community” and 
“international law”. The line of argument is clear: 1) the people who make 
up any community need to be governed by a set of rules; 2) the multiple 
peoples of the world also make up a community; and 3) consequently, 
these are also meant to interact through a set of rules. That imagined (glo-
bal) political community predates by two centuries the Civitas Gentium 
proposed by Kant and constitutes one of the first conceptualizations of an 
“international community”. 
Thus, from the jumble of Natural Law thought, the Dominican formu-
lated quite a revolutionary idea. The closest precursor in the Western world 
is the Civitas Dei of Augustine of Hippo (345-430), that proposed, as an 
alternative to the Roman Empire, a plurality of peoples that coexist in peace 
within their natural borders, “as there are very many houses of citizens in a 
city”.25 But it was in Vitoria’s age that the idea of a worldwide order began 
to be formalized, in sharp contrast to previous ideas of segmented orders 
based on hierarchical (or non-egalitarian) criteria.26 
For Truyol, this vision amounts to “conceiving humankind as a moral 
person bringing together all states under Natural Law”. The words of this his-
torian of International law help to explain the significance of the Totus Orbis: 
Without completely suppressing the idea of Christendom, so dear to the Middle Ages, 
and whose driving principle was the profession of a single shared religious faith, that 
idea, nevertheless, ultimately became the core of the system of international relations. 
24) Vitoria, F. “De Indis, de tit non leg, proposition 7”, in Obras … op. cit. 
25) Augustine of Hippo, City of God, IV, 15.
26) Truyol, A. “El Derecho de Gentes como orden universal” … op. cit., p. 18.
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It was this idea that, in time, allowed the successive incorporation of non-Christian 
states into the international community, thanks to which International Law has a 
universal character.27 
Francisco de Vitoria envisioned the ‘rules of the game’ for the world as a 
political community by reengineering the doctrine of the ius gentium. To 
this end, he modified the concept into something newly applicable as an 
instrument by which to regulate that world political community. Starting 
with the definition by Gaius (160 AD) of the law of people (“the law that 
natural reason has established among all men”), Vitoria replaced the words 
“people/men” with the words “peoples/nations” and thus introduced a sec-
ond sense to the classical concept of law for all mankind. Thus, in contrast 
to the Roman sense, Vitoria conceived the ius gentium as ius inter gentes 
(“law among peoples”): quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit, 
vocatur ius gentium (“what natural reason has established among all peoples 
is called ius gentium”). This change in the Gaian definition of ius gentium 
(“inter omnes gentes” instead of “inter omnes homines”) was instrumental 
to the development of the idea of international law. 
Obviously, rules between societies predate Francisco de Vitoria. Their gen-
esis is not to be found in academic scholarship, but rather in those political 
communities (/tribes) that forged agreements among themselves, throughout 
the five continents, since the dawn of civilization.28 The friar is obviously 
not intellectually responsible for the complex phenomenon of the develop-
ment of those norms that political communities establish in their mutual 
relations. In addition, he had no intention of nurturing a general discourse 
on the foundations of a new world legal order. In fact, he grounded his ius 
gentium on a diffuse plurality of sources without a clear relationship among 
them: 1) natural law; 2) custom; 3) ‘original’ social consent; 4) the consent 
of all peoples; 5) collective decision making (i.e. majority decision); etc. For 
Tierney, those categories were cited on a random basis. In his opinion, the 
friar displayed a “considerable versatility” in deploying norms of international 
law or “even in inventing such norms on occasion”.29 However, it is precisely 
27) Truyol, A. “Prémisses philosophiques du ‘totus orbis’ de Vitoria”, 7 Anuario de la Asoci-
ación Francisco de Vitoria (1946-1947): 179.
28) See, in particular, Bederman, D.J. International law in Antiquity, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002.
29) Tierney, B. “Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium … op. cit. p. 101.
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this inventiveness that was his genius. 
Francisco de Vitoria reengineered several legal traditions to produce 
something new: ius gentium as ius inter gentes. That product of his political 
and legal imagination would pave the way to Grotius’s conviction regard-
ing the law of nations (De Jure Belli, 1625): “fully convinced … that there is 
a common law among nations, which is valid alike for war and in war”. In 
conclusion, the professor from Salamanca gave birth to a big idea that many 
others, since then, have cultivated as a discipline and that has proved to be 
one of the most useful and now pervasive social artefacts of human progress. 
Nevertheless, the relevance of Vitoria in the formation of this idea has 
been challenged in contemporary literature. The conventional academic au-
thority in this regard is the German-born American jurist Arthur Nussbaum 
(1877-1964).30 Essentially, Nussbaum argued in A Concise History of the Law 
of Nations that the substitution of “men” by “peoples” in the definition of ius 
gentium in the De Indis may well have been a faulty transcription, perhaps “a 
momentary flash of Vitoria’s mind” (1st edition) or even “a slip of memory” 
(2nd edition).31 However, the following line of the Relectio contains an 
express reference to the phrase apud omnes nationes (“among all nations”): 
Quod naturalis ratio inter omnes gentes constituit, vocatur ius gentium. Sic enim apud 
omnes nationes habetur inhumanum sine aliqua speciali causa hospites et peregrinos 
male accipere.
In addition, these are the words of Vitoria, in his Commentary on the Summa 
Theologiae of Thomas Aquinas, referring to the inviolability of ambassadors: 
“et isto modo legati admissi sunt de iure gentium, et apud omnes nationes sunt 
inviolabiles”. And finally, the following line in the Commentary makes the 
whole issue conclusive: 
Ita de iure gentium dicimus quod quoddam factum est ex communi consensu gentium 
et nationum.32 
30) See Cheatham, E.E., Friedmann, W.G., Gellhorn, W., Jessup, P.C., Reese, W.L.M., and 
Wallace, S.C. “Arthur Nussbaum: A Tribute” 57 Columbia Law Review 1 (1957): 1-7.
31) See Nussbaum, A. A Concise History of the Law of Nations, Mcmillan (1st Ed), 1947, pp. 
58-59 and (2nd Ed) 1954, pp. 80-81.
32) See Vitoria, F. Comentarios a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomas, edition by Vicente 
Beltrán de Heredia, Vol. III, De Justitia, quaestio 57, Salamanca, 1934. 
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In sum, the idea is certainly there: Vitoria was transforming the conventional 
meaning of ius gentium. 
Nonetheless, determining what was the first intellectual formulation of 
such a far-reaching idea as “international law” is undoubtedly a sensitive 
cultural issue. Rossi’s book on Brown Scott’s “self-imposed mission” to 
trace the origins of international law to Vitoria is a good example.33 This 
persistent cultural issue is perfectly illustrated in the following crude and 
provocative conclusion of Topulos, interpreting the mentioned work of 
Rossi: “To a certain degree, Scott had a bias in favour of the Catholic view 
of the world, and therefore may have overemphasized the Catholic origins 
of international law. Vitoria was Catholic; Grotius was Protestant”.34 
In any case, there are more promising approaches to Francisco de Vi-
toria and Hugo Grotius once the “who was first” question is left aside. 
For example, De Indis did not result from any consultation requested by 
Charles V but was clearly aimed to provide him with theological guidance 
on the Indies while Grotius’s Mare Liberum (1609) resulted from a legal 
brief, De Jure Praede (On the Law of Spoils),35 originally written on behalf 
of the Dutch East India Company, an early ‘globalised company’. In fact, 
the plea for the freedom of the seas followed a request by the executives of 
the company.36 Therefore, two of the first key documents of the history of 
international law as a discipline were written under the shadow of great 
global players of that age: an Emperor and a corporation. 
Another interesting approach is that Vitoria’s document was a university 
conference written in the tradition of theological thought while Grotius’s 
initial legal document (De Jure Praede) was originally written by commis-
sion (legal brief ). Thus the orientation of Mare Liberum and De Indis is 
naturally different. Grotius himself illustrated this point. In 1613, on a Dutch 
diplomatic mission to resolve matters of monopoly and other commercial 
activities in the East Indies, he was challenged by the English with a quote 
33) See Rossi, Ch. Broken Chain of Being: James Brown Scott and the Origins of Modern 
international law, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 7.
34) Topulos, Kh. “Book Review”, 28 International Journal of Legal Information (2000): 150.
35) See Anand, R.P. Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhoof Publish-
ers, 1982, pp. 10-123.
36) See Van Ittersum, M.J. Profit and Principle: Hugo Grotius, Natural rights theories and 
the Rise of the Dutch power in the East Indies 1595-1615, Brill Academic publishing, 2005, pp. 
XIX-LXX
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from his own anonymously published Mare Liberum. Grotius responded by 
stating that contracts with natives have precedence over the law of nations, 
adding that the anonymous author would most certainly agree with him.37 
In short, there are more interesting issues to address than the merely 
foundational question. In any case, that question is addressed with a reason-
able statement from Verhoeven: “We should not ask of Vitoria more than 
he can give. The Law of Peoples is still there in his utterings. The essential 
thing is nonetheless in place.” In the balanced opinion of this historian, 
Francisco de Vitoria basically “sets the stage” in such a way that the central 
theme would become international law. However, Vitoria merely wrote 
the “prologue”.38 
Thus, the ideas of Vitoria opened the way for a new discipline: the study of 
the rules that govern the relations among political communities. In opening 
this path, he inaugurated the ‘invisible college of international lawyers’.39 
In any case, the discipline is obviously, in the words of Haggenmacher, a 
“collective creation”.40 Every new idea is the fruit of a collective intellectual 
quest that allows the contemporary man to build upon the past.41 Thus, 
classic international law was born of an aggregate of influences; but for 
this, Vitoria certainly did his part by pointing out and opening new paths 
for others. 
The man who first suggested the idea of international law as a discipline 
was certainly the friar (by reengineering Aristotelian-Thomist philosophy, 
Roman law and the ius commune) while the first systematizer of the new 
discipline is Hugo Grotius. Brown Scott’s definition of the latter thinker 
is certainly accurate: a “master compiler and expounder”.42 In essence, the 
Dutch attorney “worked out” the ideas of Vitoria and others in writing 
the first widely recognized “product” of the new legal discipline: the Mare 
Liberum. 
37) See Anand, R.P. Origin and development … op. cit. pp. 96-97.
38) Verhoeven, J. “Vitoria ou la matrice du droit international”, Actualité de la pensée juridique 
de Francisco de Vitoria, Bruylant, 1998, pp. 97-128.
39) On the idea of the invisible college in general see Owen, G. The Book Nobody Read: 
Chasing the Revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus. Penguin Books, 2004 (Chapter 11). 
40) Haggenmacher, P. “La place de Francisco de Vitoria … op. cit. p. 36.
41) See Mondolfo, R. Figuras e Ideas en la Filosofía del Renacimiento, Buenos Aires, 1954.
42) Brown Scott, J. The Spanish origins … op. cit., p. 521-522.
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Let us now examine in depth these new ideas. According to Vitoria, 
the Orb “has the right to make laws that are just and appropriate for all, 
such as the law of peoples … and no kingdom may lawfully exclude itself 
from the law of peoples because it is ordained by the authority of the Orb as 
a whole.”43 For the Dominican, ius gentium is a set of universal norms that 
regulate the relations among peoples. Its foundations sometimes stem from 
natural law, and at other times, from positive law.44 Thus, in certain pas-
sages ius gentium arises as positive law from the “mutual consent of peoples 
and nations” (“ex communi consensu omnium gentium et nationum”) while 
in others, it is based on natural law.45 The consensus-based approach was 
later developed by authors such as Suarez and Grotius who separated the ius 
gentium from natural law by maintaining that the latter is a law comprising 
the unwritten customs among nations. 
The ideas of ius inter gentes and the res publica of the whole world (Totus 
Orbis) are intellectual constructs that may be understood as by-products 
resulting from the Encounter between the Old and New World. The age saw 
a flourishing of utopian thinking with social rules and consequently law as 
a central part of those new social visions and conceptions.46 Friars were no 
strangers to those currents of creative thought that produced masterpieces 
like the Civitas solis, poetica idea Reipublicae philosophicae (1623) of the 
Dominican Tomasso Campanella (1568-1639). That fictional account of a 
sailor landing on the island of Taprobana is obviously a blend of sociologi-
cal creativity with the chronicles of the men that reached the New World. 
Furthermore, a significant portion of those reaching the New World were 
also motivated by utopian thinking (i.e: the New Jerusalem, etc). 
That was particularly the case of many members of religious orders. 
A vivid example of the power of that motivation was the fascinating di-
ary of the voyage of a group of 16 Dominicans to Chiapas that left San 
43) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili, Proposition 21”, in Obras … op. cit.
44) Vitoria makes a distinction between three categories of law: divine law, human law 
and natural law. See Rubin, A. “International law in the age of Columbus”, 39 Netherland 
International Law Review (1992): 5-35.
45) See Vitoria, F. Comentarios a la Secunda secundae de Santo Tomas, edition by Vicente 
Beltrán de Heredia, Vol. III, De Justitia, quaestio 57, Salamanca, 1934, p. 15.
46) See Ramiro, M.A. Utopia y Derecho: El sistema jurídico en las sociedades ideales, Marcial 
Pons, 2002.
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Esteban (Salamanca) on January 12, 1544.47 Utopian thinking also directly 
influenced the higher ranks of the Church in the Indies. In fact, the first 
Bishop of México himself, Fray Juan de Zumárraga, possessed a heavily 
annotated copy of Thomas More’s rationalist fantasy, Utopia (1516).48 It is 
also noteworthy, in this regard, that Zumárraga was the man who advised 
the Emperor Charles V to consult Francisco de Vitoria on some theological 
issues concerning the Indies. 
In sum, the need to formulate responses to the new challenges posed 
by the Encounter of the New World led Vitoria, like others, to stretch 
imagination. It is through this intellectual voyage to the unknown that he 
arrived at notions instrumental to the construction of the secular law of 
nations. The blackfriar made additional contributions that are also worthy 
of mention. His natural law conception of ius gentium is of special inter-
est. In this particular area, one of the most challenging ideas offered by the 
friar is that of the ius communicationis: a defense of the natural right to free 
communication among peoples and nations. This idea connecting to the 
ius humanae societatis of Giovanni d’Andrea (1275-1348) allowed for a new 
approach to the relations among peoples.49 
Vitoria initiates the ius communicationis argument with the following 
statement: “the first proof comes from the law of peoples which either is 
natural law or derives from natural law … Among all nations it is considered 
inhumane to treat guests and travellers badly without special cause”. This is 
where the Dominican suggests the possibility of “just titles” for the conquest 
of America. The matter is summed up in this statement: “the Spanish have 
a right to travel into the lands in question and to sojourn there, provided 
they do no harm to the natives, and the natives may not prevent them.”50 He 
likewise proceeded to enumerate a series of specific universal rights derived 
from the ius communicationis: “all persons have the right to migrate to any 
nation, to live there for the duration they so desire, and not to be expelled 
there from in times of peace without just cause; they have the right to trade 
freely with other nations and to participate in property held in common”. 
47) See De la Torre, T. Diario de Viaje: De Salamanca a Ciudad Real de Chiapa 1544-1545 
(Cándido Aniz Ed), Ed.OPE, 1985.
48) Pagden, A. Political imagination … op. cit. p. 25.
49) Truyol, A. “Vitoria et la tradition scolastique” … op. cit. p. 81
50) Vitoria, F. “De Indis, de tit leg, Proposition 2”, in Obras … op. cit.
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Furthermore, the friar proclaimed that certain things are not subject to 
appropriation: “if there are among the Indians any things which are treated 
as common to both citizens and strangers, the Indians may not prevent the 
Spanish from communication and participation in them.”51 He likewise 
suggested and defended the freedom of navigation and commerce, freedoms 
intimately linked to human communication and cooperation: “by natural 
law water and the sea are common to all, so are rivers and harbours, and 
by the law of nations ships from all parts may be moored there; and on 
the same principle they are public things. Therefore it is not lawful to keep 
anyone from them.”52 In addition, he defended free trade by asserting that 
“neither may the native princes hinder their subjects from carrying on trade 
with the Spanish, nor, on the other hand, may the princes of Spain prevent 
commerce with the natives.”53 Therefore, it is reasonable to sustain that this 
‘basket of rights’, woven from the natural right of communication, is of 
universal projection. 
This ius communicationis implied for the Dominican the right to travel 
(ius perigrinandi) as well as the right to trade and the right to preach (ius 
praedicandi) without interference. The deprivation of the natural rights 
conferred by the ius gentium would constitute an iniuria. Consequently, 
the Spanish could enforce these rights even if opposed by the Amerindians. 
In the mind of Francisco de Vitoria, those were the legitimating grounds 
for the presence of the Spanish in America. As a logical result, this title is a 
cornerstone of his thinking concerning relations among peoples. However, 
as Pagden points out, this “right to society and natural communication’ 
(naturalis societas et communicationis) has received less attention than oth-
ers, although it certainly appears to a be a “title” of his own invention.54 
In his opinion, Europe turned a deaf ear to the idea of this right despite 
its power and originality. For Pagden, the reason is simple: the possibility 
that a vaguely defined notion of “human communication”, or the mere 
principle of hospitality, could become a principle of law might threaten 
the whole system of sovereignty emerging at the end of the 16th century, 
a system in which the rights of sovereignty, according to Thomas Hobbes, 
51) Vitoria, F.”De Indis, de tit leg, proposition 4”, in Obras … op. cit.
52) Vitoria, F. “De Indis, de tit leg, proposition 2”, in Obras … op. cit.
53) Vitoria, F.”De Indis, de tit leg, proposition 3”, in Obras … op. cit. 
54) Pagden, A. La ilustración y sus enemigos, Península, 2002, p. 102.
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were “indivisible and incommunicable”.55 In essence, if the new emerging 
nation-states were to protect their borders, limitations to the free movement 
of persons could not be questioned.56 
In consequence, following Pagden’s argument, although Vitoria failed 
to establish this right, he developed a language of great potential that Kant 
-without having read Vitoria- would revive in similar terms.57 More than 
two hundred years later, the ius cosmopoliticum of the Perpetual Peace (1795) 
focuses on the “conditions of universal hospitality”, and confers a precise 
meaning to “hospitality”. For Padgen, Kant’s “hospitality” is the old Span-
ish friar’s right of all persons to freely move about in the world.58 This is 
certainly an interesting interpretation 
However, the title of ius communicationis has also been interpreted in 
a rather opposite sense. Tierney suggests, for example, that Vitoria seems 
to have abandoned caution and instead “displayed a rather bold creative 
imagination in discovering or inventing new rights for the Spanish within 
the law of nations” (emphasis added). Vitoria claimed that the ius commu-
nication conferred these rights upon the Spanish “even without consent” 
(of the Indians) and granted them the right to use force if these rights were 
violated. In Tierney’s opinion, “as the argument goes on it becomes more 
and more unpersuasive, not only to the modern reader [but even to his] 
immediate successors at Salamanca”.59 And here, Tierney recalls the famously 
sarcastic statement of one of Victoria’s favourite disciples, Melchor Cano, 
who observed that the Spanish did not enter the Indian lands merely as 
travellers, “unless we call Alexander [the Great] a traveller”.60 Evidently, 
the controversy over the ius communicationis has always been there and still 
permeates academic references to the works of the Dominican. 
55) See Hobbes, T. Leviathan, Part II, Chapter XVIII.
56) Pagden, A. La ilustración … op. cit. p. 102.
57) Pagden, A. “El ideal cosmopolita, la aristocracia y el triste sino del universalismo europeo”, 
15 Revista internacional de Filosofía Política (2000): 21-41.
58) Pagden, A. La ilustración … op. cit. p. 108.
59) Tierney, B. “Vitoria and Suarez on ius gentium, natural law, and custom”, The Nature of 
Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (A. Perreau-Saussine and J. 
Bernard Murphy Eds), Cambridge University Press, 2007, p. 109.
60) Cano, M. “Dominio Indorum”, De bello contra insulanos, Corpus Hipanorum de Pace, 
Vol. IX, CSIC, 1982, p. 579.
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3.  Structures of the Law of War
The ius communicationis connects with several of Francisco de Vitoria’s 
major ideas on the law of war. For the friar, the right to travel peacefully 
and to “enjoy hospitality” is part of the law that has survived from the dawn 
of society. Thus, an infringement of this law is a just cause for war. This is 
also an area in which the Dominican made seminal contributions to the 
development of the discipline of International law.61 In fact, the Dominican 
is widely recognized for his reflections on the law of war in De Indis sive de 
Iure Belli hispanorum in Barbaros. 
In the years after 1516, conquests by the Ottoman Empire in the eastern 
Mediterranean and the Balkans revived the ideal of the res publica Christiana 
based on a desire for peace within the Christian World (wars of religion) 
and a pressing need for a common front against the Turks. However, the 
conflict between Francis I and Charles V for hegemony in Italy made it 
impossible to develop that common front. 
Vitoria’s major contributions to the development of the law of war are 
the systematic formulation of the conditions required for a just war and the 
universal application of these formulas (both to Christians and infidels) on 
the basis of natural law.62 Thus he inaugurates this early systematization of 
the law of war by opposing the unconditional right to war against infidels 
such as that defended by Henry of Susa, Bishop of Ostia (1200-1271). For 
the Dominican, in sharp contrast to the positions of Hostiensis, war is a 
means for righting wrongs. Therefore, he explored issues such as: 1) what 
circumstances make war lawful; 2) who has the authority to declare war; 3) 
what actions are lawful during war; and finally, 4) what are the just causes 
for going to war. In sum, Francisco de Vitoria framed the problem of war as 
a question of justice; and thereby, this conceptualization was an important 
step towards its restriction.63 
In his response to these questions, the Dominican distinguishes between 
the laws justifying war (ius ad bellum) and the laws governing war (ius in 
bello). This fruitful distinction, envisaged early on by men like Augustine 
of Hippo still govern some of the inner workings of international law con-
cerning the use of force and international humanitarian law. Francisco 
61) Haggenmacher, P. “La place de Francisco de Vitoria … op. cit. p. 76-77.
62) Truyol, A. “Vitoria et la tradition scolastique” … op. cit. p. 82
63) Solages, B.D. La théologie de la guerre juste, Paris, 1946, 18.
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de Vitoria applied the concepts of defensive and offensive war to analyze 
the lawfulness of war. According to the friar, defensive war is always law-
ful under natural law, while offensive war is to be undertaken only as a 
response to an unlawful action. The Dominican further reasoned that the 
only just cause for the declaration of war is having been seriously injured. 
Moreover, under his weltanschauung, wars of expansion are not just wars. In 
fact, conquered territories could not be annexed nor could wars waged for 
“the glory and benefit of princes” be considered just. In addition, Vitoria 
also rejected private wars and maintained that the authority to declare war 
resided exclusively in the prince. 
For Vitoria, peace was already a societal value to be taken into account 
seriously in the making of decisions. Thus, a caveat was added: the immedi-
ate purpose of war was to preserve the peace and security of the res publica. 
For the Dominican, war must have as its central purpose the “common 
good of Totus Orbis”. In consequence, this “common good” becomes a 
criterion for determining whether to go to war or to refrain from doing 
so. Vitoria likewise attempted to mitigate the effects of war on the civilian 
populace (ius in bello) by following Alexander III’s distinction between the 
innocent (innocentes) and the guilty (nocentes). Under this conception, 
women, children, foreigners (hospites) and the civilian population (gente 
togata et pacifica) were considered innocents and thus could not lawfully 
be killed by combatants. In addition, the friar defended the idea of treating 
prisoners as innocents, while enumerating the exceptions in which it was 
lawful to execute them.
Prompted by the news of the fate of the Indians in the Yucatan, Vito-
ria reflected upon the need to defend innocent people from the “tyranny 
and oppression” of their lords. At the same time he took into account the 
practices of some American Indian peoples, such as human sacrifice and 
cannibalism.64 In such cases, he maintained that it was lawful for other 
peoples to intervene (go to war) in order to prevent those practices, since 
these were violations of natural law and the law of peoples.65 The Dominican 
also defended the lawfulness of deposing Amerindian rulers in such cases. 
Before that is done, however, an initial attempt should be made to intimi-
64) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 15”, Obras … op. cit.
65) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 15” and “De Temperantia”, proposi-
tion 7”, Obras … op. cit.
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date them into abandoning such practices; but if that was not successful, 
war had to be declared on them and, thereafter, their rulers deposed. To 
these just grounds for deposition, Vitoria added two more: “because of the 
number and aggravated quality of the damages and wrongs which have 
been wrought or, especially, when security and peace cannot otherwise be 
had of the enemy and grave danger from them would threaten the state if 
this were not done”.66 
Thus Vitoria speculated that the ius gentium might permit peoples in 
one part of the world to intervene in the affairs of peoples in another on 
strictly humanitarian grounds. Under this conception, the power of Princes 
is transformed into an instrument for the common good of the whole world: 
“since the res publica is part of the entire globe and a Christian province 
principally part of all of the res publica, if war is of use to a province or even 
more to a res publica, but injures the world or Christendom, I think for that 
reason it would be unjust.”67 Thus, as Barbier points out, the Dominican 
ascribes universal dimensions to the res publica, wherein the princes are 
“responsible for the protection of the whole world and for the common 
good of humankind”.68
In essence, De Indis sive de Iure Belli hispanorum in Barbaros is a well-
developed theorization of the law of war. In fact, it is one of the central 
inspirations for Grotius’s De Jure Belli Ac Pacis. To the modern mind, the 
conception of war in these works is of course over-simplified, with the 
striking belief, as Hamilton puts it, that one side must be in the right and 
most of all, that a ‘just’ prince could take the place of a judge.69 However 
one sees it, those ideas were remarkably advanced for an age in which war 
was generally considered a natural legal mechanism to resolve disputes 
among princes. 
The impetus for this theorization of the law of war was the Dominican’s 
particular concern over the actions of the Spanish in the American Indies as 
well as over the devastating religious wars in Europe. In particular, Francisco 
66) Vitoria, F. “De Indis sive de Iure Belli hispanorum in Barbaros, proposition 59”, Obras 
… op. cit.
67) Vitoria, F. “De potestate civili, proposición 13”, in Obras … op. cit.
68) Barbier, M. “La notion de respublica chez Vitoria”, (Yves Charles, Ed), Aspects de la pensée 
médiévale dans la philosophie politique moderne, PUF, 1999, 96-97.
69) Hamilton, B. Political Thought in Sixteenth-Century Spain … op. cit., p. 170.
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de Vitoria strongly opposed the struggle between the Habsburg and Valois-
Angoulême dynasties, and in consequence Charles V’s entire policy towards 
France. As he stated in his private correspondence, “wars were not invented 
for the good of princes but rather of their peoples; and if this be true, as 
it is, consider well men of good will, if our wars be for the good of Spain, 
or France, or Italy or Germany, and not to the destruction of them all.”70
In fact, not only did Vitoria express his critical ideas concerning this 
state of affairs in the Relectios, but he personally advocated for peace in 
his private contact and correspondence with the notables of Spain. The 
correspondence between the friar and his friend Don Pedro Fernández de 
Velasco, Condestable of Castile and Count of Haro, is illustrative in this 
regard; Vitoria writes, 
It is well-known how little heed princes pay to anyone’s recommendations, especially if 
they lie not within their inclination, but if any might occasion his Majesty, none more 
than [your Lordship] by your many titles…I think it may go hard, but if a way could 
be found to give some pause between his Majesty and the King of France, I believe 
that would be an even greater victory than the battle of Tunis.71
The Dominican strongly opposed Charles V’s attempt, in 1538, to obtain 
new war taxes. That same year, at the Courts of Toledo, Vitoria’s friend 
Don Pedro responded to the imperial demands that a general tax be ap-
proved to fund the wars in Europe with these bold words, addressed to the 
Emperor himself: 
It is of the utmost importance … that you likewise be entreated to work towards uni-
versal peace with all for a time. For be the war upon the infidels ever so just, peace is 
often to be had with them, as was had by the kings of Castile with the kings of Granada. 
As might be expected, the Condestable of Castile’s speech enraged Charles V 
so much that he suspended the sessions and even threatened to throw Don 
Pedro to the corridor with his own hands.72 In fact, that was the last time 
that notables and prelates would be represented in the Courts of Toledo.
70) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit. p. 218.
71) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit. p. 220-221.
72) The answer of Don Pedro was audacious: “Mirarlo ha mejor Vuestra Majestad, que si bien 
soy pequeño peso mucho”. See Sandoval, P. Historia de la Vida y Hechos del Emperador Carlos 
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4.  Doubts on the Indies
Not only was Francisco de Vitoria critical of the decisions taken by the 
monarch concerning the res publica of Spain, but he also disagreed on the 
American Indies. The blackfriar had access to accurate information on the 
actions of the Spaniards in those lands. His own sources of information 
were the first-hand accounts of objecting missionaries, as well as those of 
soldiers that contacted the University of Salamanca to consult on moral 
and legal issues related to the conquest.73 
Vitoria’s first references to the Indies appeared in his lectures of 1535 and 
1536. However, before these, Vitoria had already written the following lines 
in a private letter to his friend Manuel de Arcos, Prior of the College of San 
Gregorio (Valladolid): 
The things that I learn [concerning the events involving the peoples of Peru upon the 
arrival of Spanish] no longer horrify or embarrass me, except the trickery and profiteer-
ing and things of the Indies [(trampas y beneficios y cosas de Indias)], which make my 
blood freeze on just hearing of them (1534).74 
In this letter, Vitoria stated that there may be people who would excuse and 
praise those “events, killings and spoils”. He, on the other hand, refused to 
defend those men he labelled with the derogatory term peruleros. Thus the 
blackfriar expressed his consternation about excusing them: 
I contrive to do likewise with the peruleros, although they are few, yet some come by 
here. I do not declare nec excito tragoedias against the ones nor against the others, but 
rather, since I cannot pretend, nor say nothing more, but that I do not understand 
it, and scarce can see the justice or certainty in it, that they consult with others who 
might better comprehend it.
His strong objection in this regard was made even more manifest with: “May 
my tongue and my hand wither if I speak or write anything so inhuman 
and apart from all Christianity.”75 The last statement of his letter clearly 
V, Libro 24, Año 1538, n. VIII, 1614.
73) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit. pp. 99-100.
74) Vitoria, F. “Carta de Francisco de Vitoria a Manuel de Arcos sobre negocios en Indias”, 
Corpus Hipanorum de Pace, Vol. V, CSIC, 1967, p. 137.
75) Vitoria, F. “Relectio de Indis”, Corpus Hisparorum de Pace, vol V, CSIC, 1967, p. 137. 
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captures his position, and also the social challenge posed by the encounter 
of the Old and New World: 
In truth, if the Indians are not men, but monkeys, non sunt capaces iniuriae. But if they 
be fellow humans, et quod ipse prae se ferunt, vassals of the Emperor, I do not see how 
to excuse these conquerors of such ultimate impiety and tyranny, nor do I see what 
great service they render his majesty by laying to waste his vassals.76
This passage contains a blend of medieval legal categories, anthropological 
reflections and moral and religious concerns that captures the mentality of 
this man of the 16th century. These private reflections represent the wide 
mixture of concerns, motives and legal foundations that would later give 
shape to such a groundbreaking text as De Indis. It is important to recall 
that it was a time of great uncertainty in which the very humanity of the 
American Indian was a matter of doctrinal controversy, and continued to 
be so even after the papal bull Sublimis Deus (1537). These private reflections 
of Vitoria would soon find their way to public audience through a series 
of lectures and conferences. In fact, the first De Indis contains an express 
comment on the newness of the issue in the world of the written word: “It 
must be kept in mind that I have seen nothing written on this question.” 
The text condenses some of Vitoria’s most powerful ideas on the Am-
erindian character, their relations with the Spanish, and the Crown’s titles 
to the New World. The Relectio follows the typical structures of argumen-
tation of Scholastic thought. It divides, however, into two sections that 
are incompatible: one is stating that the Spanish had no right to conquer 
those territories, and the other is pondering several possible “just titles”.77 
As such, the blackfriar begins the first part of his commentary with this 
statement: “from all I have heard, there is no doubt that the Indians were 
“publicly, privately, and peacefully in possession of their things” before the 
arrival of the Spanish. Thus, the possible grounds on which to allege that 
the Indians were not the rightful masters of their lands (dominium), but 
“barbarians”, was that they were either 1) sinners, 2) infidels, 3) insensate, 
or 4) amentes (idiots). In response, Vitoria decides to assess these titles in 
76) Vitoria, F. “Relectio … op. cit. p. 138-139.
77) Cavallar, G. “Vitoria, Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel: Accomplices of European 
Colonialism and Exploitation or True Cosmopolitans”, Journal of History of International 
Law 10 (2008): 209.
21
            
detail and concludes that being in a state of mortal sin does not preclude 
ownership,78 nor does unbelief,79 nor their potentially barbarian condition, 
their “want of reason”, or their “unsoundness of mind”.80 Therefore, none of 
these “titles” could provide the Castilian crown with dominion in America.81 
This line of reasoning has led some academic literature to attribute to 
Vitoria a defence of the legal equality of peoples.82 However, he does make 
statements in both directions, as the “just titles” in the second part of the 
Relectio (i.e: ius communicationis and ius praedicandi) clearly illustrate.83 
For the Dominican, for example, “Christians have the right to preach and 
publish the Gospel in the lands of the barbarians.”84 As a result, Vitoria 
deduces the following conclusion: 
if the Indians, whether it be their lords or the populace, prevent the Spanish from 
freely preaching the Gospel, the Spanish, after first reasoning with them in order to 
quell objections, may preach it despite their unwillingness and devote themselves to 
the conversion of the peoples in question, and if need be they may then accept or 
even make war, until they succeed in obtaining facilitation and security for preaching 
the Gospel.85 
Furthermore, Vitoria speculated on the hypothetically exclusive right of 
Spain to evangelize, since “although it is a task common and permitted to all, 
yet the Pope may have entrusted it to Spain and forbidden it to all others”.86 
That position is self-explanatory if we contextualize the man: Francisco de Vi-
toria was a Friar Preacher, a member of the Ordo Praedicatorum. This Order, 
in addition to being a traditional defender of Orthodoxy, sent a significant 
contingent of its members to evangelize the New World as missionaries. Thus 
it should come as no surprise that the “Spanish obligation to missionize”, 
78) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 6”, Obras … op. cit.
79) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, propositions 7-10”, Obras … op. cit.
80) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, propositions 19-23”, Obras … op. cit.
81) Pagden, A. Political imagination … op. cit. pp. 15-21.
82) Truyol, A. “España … op. cit., p. 8.
83) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, propositions 1-8”, Obras … op. cit.
84) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 9”, Obras … op. cit.
85) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, propositions 9-12”, Obras … op. cit.
86) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 10”, Obras … op. cit.
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as Cavallar puts it,87 is central to the construction of De Indis. Within this 
contextualization, the genesis of the title of ius praedicandi becomes clear.
His defense of the ius praedicandi is certainly not a major contribution to 
the history of ideas. However, his analysis and rejection of those doubtful 
titles concerning the alleged incapacity of the American Indians surely is. 
For this analysis, Francisco de Vitoria made a full anthropological sketch of 
these peoples and their communities on the purely rational basis. The argu-
ment he considered, “though certainly not asserting it with confidence”, is 
as follows: “although the Indians in question are not wholly unintelligent, 
yet they are not far from that condition, and thus are unsuited to establish 
or administer a commonwealth both legitimate and ordered in human and 
civil terms”. Following this line of reasoning: 
it might, therefore, be maintained that in their own interests the princes of Spain might 
undertake their administration, providing them with prefects and governors for their 
towns, and even giving them new lords, so long as this be to their benefit… Such an 
argument might be based on the precept of charity, they being our neighbours and 
we being bound to look after their welfare. Let this, however, as I have already said, 
be put forward without dogmatism and subject also to the limitation that any such 
interposition be for the welfare and in the interests of the Indians and not merely for 
the profit of the Spaniards.88
The Dominican did consider, however, the possibility that the Indians’ 
capacity to govern their life and affairs might be less than fully developed; 
in that case, some sort of tutelage might possibly be imposed over them 
until they reached the ‘age of reasoning’. However, Vitoria did not endorse 
this assessment, but neither did he condemn it. He spoke to the matter in 
the following vein: 
The truth of the matter is that they are not of unsound mind but have, according to 
their kind, the use of reason. This is clear, because there is a certain method in their 
affairs; they have polities which are carefully arranged and they have definite marriage 
and magistrates, overlords, laws, and workshops, and a system of exchange, all of 
which require the use of reason.
87) See Cavallar, G. “Vitoria, Grotius … op. cit. p. 189.
88) Vitoria, F.”De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 18”, Obras … op. cit.
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Consequently, Vitoria does not associate their apparent lack of reason to 
any inherent defect of nature: “accordingly I for the most part attribute 
their seeming so unintelligent and simple-minded to a bad and barbarous 
upbringing, for even amongst us there are many peasants who differ little 
from brutes”.89 
In the analysis of the blackfriar, the Indian is like a grown child whose 
rational potential is not yet developed.90 However, he strongly rejected the 
Aristotelian idea of natural slavery,91 later supported by Hostensis as well 
as Juan Gines de Sepulveda, the Erasmist author of Democrates Alter. For 
Vitoria, on the other hand, the Indian was to be considered as a rational 
being. As such, Vitoria claimed American Indians’ right to be treated as 
humans.92 The uncivilized Indian, not being inferior by nature, is therefore 
not subordinate to civilized men, but must be educated, and thus made 
civilized. As he stated at the end of the lecture, if it is true that the Amerin-
dians live “almost like beasts and wild animals”, this is not because of their 
lack of rationality but because of their “poor and barbarous education”. 
In sum, the viewpoint he expressed was patently paternalistic; and al-
though it is connected to the idea of equality among men, it is biased in 
favour of Europeans who must care for and educate the Indians. His posi-
tion is illustrated with an artificial construct: a land in which all adults have 
perished and only children and adolescents have survived. In that scenario, 
the European princes should care for and govern them while they be in such 
a state.93 By analogy, the same treatment should be afforded to the Indians. 
However, he does not assert this “possible title” with confidence. Thus 
Vitoria postulates it for the sake of the argument: “this is another title 
which indeed cannot be confirmed, but rather brought up for discussion, 
and some think it a lawful one. I dare not affirm it at all, nor do I condemn 
it entirely.”94 Certainties coexist with doubts in the texts of the blackfriar. 
89) Vitoria, F.”De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 23”, Obras … op. cit.
90) Pagden, A. The fall of natural man. The American Indian and the origins of comparative 
ethnology, Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 104.
91) See Aristotle. Politics, Harvard University Press, 1977. 
92) Hamilton, B. Political Thought … op. cit., p. 169.
93) Vitoria, F. “De Indis sive de Iure Belli hispanorum in Barbaros, proposition 18”, Obras 
… op. cit.
94) Vitoria, F. “De Indis recenter inventis, proposition 18”, Obras … op. cit.
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This public and open questioning by a Theologian of great recognition was 
a major historical step in the process of applying reason to the relations 
among peoples.
In addition, he also considered the crucial issue of property rights – do-
minium rerum in the language of natural jurisprudence -95 of the Spanish 
vis a vis the Amerindians.96 And here, the text of De Indis is both precise 
and particularly impressive: “Let us finally conclude: that prior to the ar-
rival of the Spanish in the Indies the barbarians were publicly and privately 
[the] true lords [of their lands].” As Pagden explains, the Relectios of the 
blackfriar left the Castilian crown with only “a slender claim to jurisdiction 
(dominium jurisdictions) in America, but no property rights whatsoever”.97 
On one hand, Francisco de Vitoria propounded a series of natural law 
foundations questioning the expansion of power and authority of both the 
Emperor and the Pope, while on the other hand formalizing just titles to 
protect the channels of social communication and interaction of the Spanish 
with the Amerindians. In this intellectual process, the rational capacity he 
attributed to the American Indians led him to defend their public dominion 
and natural property rights. However, while he recognized the cultural and 
institutional sophistication of some of these peoples, he considered (but did 
not endorse) the advisability of establishing a system of tutelage for some of 
those peoples (“barbarians”) as a paternalistic, provisional solution to repair 
their backwardness through education. 
5.  Ideas Meet the Status quo
The Encounter stands out as one of the most convulsive events of the tran-
sition to modernity. It marks a watershed in the history of ideas in having 
changed the way mankind sees the world. From the 1530s on, the Conquest 
became a subject of heated debate in universities: the complex intellectual 
challenge of understanding the Encounter would produce several new legal 
95) See generally Spicq, C. “La notion analogique de dominium et le droit de proprieté”, 
20 Revue Sciencie, Philosophie et Theologie (1931): 52-76.
96) Pagden, A. “Dispossessing the Barbarian: The Language of Spanish Thomism and the 
Debate over the Property Rights of the American Indians” in The Language of Political Theory 
in Early-Modern Europe, (Anthony Pagden ed), Cambridge University Press, 1987: 79-98.
97) Vitoria, F. Political Writtings (Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrence eds), Cambridge 
University Press, 1991, p. xxvii
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and political ideas. This issue was certainly not within the natural realm of 
a traditional academic mind of the period. New paths had to be opened, 
and not without difficulty. 
Compelled by dramatic events and conscious of the moral dimension 
of academic work, the blackfriar took action with words. As Villey puts it, 
Catholic Spain expected a great deal from its theologians at this crossroads 
and the friar felt the need to participate by counselling the men of action, 
such as the missionaries and Bishops in America.98 Paraphrasing Truyol, the 
Dominican rejected the “flight from reality” of previous Scholasticism.99 He 
rejected its traditionally abstract type of speculation in favour of analysing 
social life with an abundance of data, erudition and imagination.
The Dominican’s questioning of the status quo was a expression of his 
moral and intellectual integrity: “I can defend nothing other than what I 
have said” (Sed ego hactenus non possum aliud intelligere nisi quod dictum est). 
By questioning, the friar revealed himself to be an early critical thinker; only 
a highly recognized theologian, or a favoured court jester (i.e: Francesillo),100 
would have dared to express himself so freely with respect to issues such 
as the just titles of the Emperor. In this sense, while Vitoria is not exactly 
a prime example of “academic freedom”, he was sufficiently protected in 
institutional terms, being a university professor, theologian and member 
of an order, to make some major intellectual leaps. He was in a privileged 
position to explore, with a degree of liberty, the relationships between 
moral concerns, ‘revealed truths’ and secular ideas under the authoritative 
framework of Theology, the “supreme science”. By virtue of speaking the 
several languages of theology, morality and reason, he was able to bridge 
the old and the new conceptions. 
These new intellectual frontiers would also be crossed by his brothers at 
San Esteban. Because the Dominicans had been the first to join the project 
of the new evangelization in America, the friars at home in San Esteban 
would be amongst the first to learn of the crude realities of the Conquest 
98) Villey, M. La formation de la pensée juridique moderne, Éditions Montchrestien, 1968, p. 
357.
99) Truyol, A. “Vitoria et la tradition scolastique”, op. cit. p. 71. 
100) Zúñiga, Francesillo de, Crónica burlesca del emperador Carlos V (Diane Pamp de Avalle-
Arce, Ed), Crítica, 1981. See also Bouza, F. Locos, enanos y hombres de placer en la Corte de los 
Austrias. Oficio de burlas, Temas de Hoy, 1991.
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in the accounts of their brothers in the New World.101 The coming and 
going of missionaries offered them an extensive knowledge of that reality. 
In 1535, Vitoria’s disciple Domingo de Soto (1495-1560) presented a Relectio 
entitled De Dominio where some of the first doubts concerning the affairs 
of the Indies are first raised: “By what right do we take possession of the 
transatlantic Empire so recently discovered? In truth, I know not”. It would 
take his master two more years to present his first formal statements on the 
question in a Relectio (1537) entitled De Temperantia (On Moderation). It 
was in that conference that Vitoria first chose to tackle the thorny issue of 
the conquest of the Indies himself. As such, De Temperantia is essentially a 
prologue or introduction to his thoughts on the issue.
This conference was given in a politically complicated year for Charles V. 
It was the same year that Pope Paul III issued the bull Sublimis Deus (May, 
1537), in which the Holy Church declared that grave offences were being 
tolerated (slavery and forced conversion) under the rule and dominion of 
the (Holy) Roman Emperor. This was certainly a major warning sign for 
Charles V.
The wording of the papal bull was particularly clear: “Indians are truly 
men” and “not only capable of understanding the Catholic Faith but, ac-
cording to our information, they desire exceedingly to receive it”. For the 
Church, the Indians “are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the 
possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of Jesus 
Christ” notwithstanding “whatever may have been or may be said to the 
contrary”. The papal document was precise: “they may and should, freely 
and legitimately, enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; 
nor should they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall 
be null and have no effect”. 
By the time of that bull, the Emperor began requesting Francisco de 
Vitoria’s counsel on certain theological issues. The ruler and the academic 
knew each other personally, since at least June 19, 1534, when the former 
visited the University of Salamanca and attended the lectures of several 
professors. Earlier still, in September 7, 1530, Isabel of Portugal had writ-
ten a letter to the University of Salamanca, requesting theological counsel 
on Henry VIII’s (of England) controversial divorce from Catherine of 
101) See Baciero, C. “Conclusiones definitivas de la segunda generación. Vitoria”, La Etica 
de la conquista de America, Corpus Hispanorum de Pace, Vol XXV; CSIC, 1984, p. 416.
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Aragon, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain and aunt to Charles 
V. The academic authorities of Salamanca selected Vitoria, together with 
Montemayor, to express their formal opinion (Parecer), which would later 
result in De Matrimonio, a Relectio delivered on January 25, 1531. 
After that, Charles V wrote to the friar directly requesting a Parecer on 
the issue of “the education and conversion of the Indians to the holy faith”. 
This letter is related to the papal bull Sublimis Deus, issued 20 months 
earlier, and marks the first time that a Bishop from the Indies, taking the 
bull seriously, posed that type of question to the Emperor. The letter was 
written in Toledo on January 31, 1539 and refers expressly to doubts raised by 
the Bishop of México, Juan de Zumárraga, to the Council of the Indies.102 
By that time, Charles V was probably not aware that Francisco de Vitoria 
had already presented the first De Indis as a conference in Salamanca Uni-
versity, on January 1, 1539. The main theme of the Relectio was whether or 
not it is lawful to baptize the children of unbelievers against the wishes of 
their parents. Six months after that conference, on June 18, the friar would 
present the second De Indis arguing in favour of universal restrictions in 
the natural right to war. 
Presenting those ideas to the most learned audience of his time (the uni-
versity community) was a major display of audacity for a professor of the 
16th century. The Emperor, being in questionable possession of the Indies 
and engaged in several wars in and around Europe as well as the New World, 
was severely irritated by these two conferences. In response, he wrote to 
the Prior of San Esteban expressing his consternation that members of his 
monastery were calling into question Spain’s rights to the Indies. A letter 
dated November 10, 1539 delivered an imperial warning: 
I have been informed that some religious men of that house have put to discussion 
and treated in their sermons and in relectios, on our right to the Indies, Islands, and 
terra firma of the Ocean Sea… [I] charge and order that thereafter, without any delay, 
you call before you the said teachers and religious men…and obtain from them sworn 
affidavits that they declare at what times and places and before what persons they have 
discussed and affirmed the aforementioned. 
102) See Real cédula del emperador Carlos V en que consulta al maestro fray Francisco de Vitoria 
sobre asuntos de Indias (Toledo, 31 de enero de 1539) in Esperabé de Arteaga, E., Historia prag-
mática e interna de la Universidad de Salamanca, vol.II, 1917, p. 427.
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In addition, Charles V ordered the Prior to collect the manuscripts refer-
ring to these texts and send them to the Royal Court. Finally, and more 
importantly, he also forbade addressing such matters in public, without his 
“express permission”.103 
It may seem surprising that, soon after that, Charles V would continue 
to request the advice of the friar for the rest of his life. Reasonably, shifting 
from sticks to carrots (counsel) was a wise policy decision towards San Es-
teban: at that time, theology was the supreme science in Europe. Moreover, 
“theological hegemony” was unquestionably vested in Spain by the Chair 
of Theology in Salamanca.104 
On April 18, 1539, another imperial letter was sent, by Zumárraga’s sug-
gestion, requesting that Vitoria select twelve clergymen of good reputation 
to be sent as missionaries to New Spain (México).105 In addition, on March 
31, 1541, Charles V formally requested (Real Cédula) that the friar formed 
a committee of theologians, under his tutelage, to make a judgement on 
the baptism of the Indians.106 As a result, on July 1 of that year, Vitoria and 
other eight theologians signed their Parecer recommending preliminary 
instruction before baptism.107 And there would be more consultations. 
Significantly, at the end of his life, the Dominican was invited by Charles 
V to assist as Imperial Theologian to the Council of Trent (1545-1563). Due 
to his advanced illness, he declined in a formal letter to the king and his son 
Phillip (April or May 1545), expressing a preference for his disciple Domingo 
de Soto. Shortly after, Vitoria died on August 12 of 1546, while the Council 
was still in its first round of sessions. 
However, it is not only the individual contributions that matters but 
what the friar envisioned in academic terms; his impact on the status quo 
is also due to his decisive contribution to the creation of a powerful school 
103) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit. p. 150.
104) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit. p. 67.
105) See Real cédula de Carlos V al maestro fray Francisco de Vitoria, en que le ruega escoja de entre 
sus discípulos doce sacerdotes de buena vida y doc trina para enviarlos a Nueva España (Toledo, 
18 de abril de 1539), in Beltrán de Heredia, V. Los manuscritos del Maestro Fray Francisco de 
Vitoria, O.P, 1928, p. 163.
106) See Real cédula de Carlos V en que consulta al maestro fray Francisco de Vitoria sobre asuntos 
de Indias (Madrid, 31 de marzo de 1541) in Esperabé de Arteaga, E. Historia … op. cit. p. 428.
107) See Parecer de los teólogos de la Universidad de Salamanca sobre el bautismo de los Indios, 
in Vitoria, F. Relectio de Indis, Corpus Hispanorum de Pace, Vol. V, CSIC, 1967, p. 158. 
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of thought that not only influenced the development of disciplines such as 
political theory, legal philosophy and what later would be called interna-
tional law, but also policy-making. In fact, the “School of Salamanca” is a 
perfect case study on the potential of schools of thought in the evolution of 
public policy. 24 of his disciples held chairs at Salamanca and around 5000 
students passed through his lecture-rooms.108 Over the following decades 
his students, pupils, colleagues and successors disseminated several common 
ideas that influenced public decision-making both in Spain and the Indies.109 
The School of Salamanca opened fronts in many ‘battles’ during its period 
of splendour. A particularly interesting example is the appearance of some of 
Vitoria’s ideas in both the formal and informal negotiations of the Council 
of Trent. Astrain describes these sessions of intense debate closely connected 
to the project of the Salamanca School. From what he recalls, the Spanish 
theologians at Trent tenaciously defended the opinion that Bishops received 
their potestas directly from God, a so-called “divine right of Bishops”. 
What one commentator of that time described as a no more than an 
“obscure theological question” was in fact extremely important in politi-
cal terms. In writing that these “theologians fought for their opinions as 
knights fight for their dames”,110 Astrain also suggests that these thinkers 
were idealists removed from reality. However, this was certainly not the case; 
the Seconda Scolastica was perfectly aware of the political relevance of this 
non “obscure theological question” for the fate of their ideas concerning 
the education of the Amerindians: it must be remembered that many of 
the Bishops in America had connections with San Esteban, and paid some 
deference to the (moral) authority of the School.
But leaving this topic for further research aside, Vitoria also had great 
impact in the areas of European diplomacy and the formation of treaties. 
As Lesaffer explains, the many references to the Christian res publica found 
in the preambles of European peace treaties of the age indicate that the 
Christian princes considered themselves to be responsible for the welfare, not 
only of their own territories and subjects “but of the whole of Christianity”. 
108) Hamilton, B. Political Thought in … op. cit. p. 175. 
109) For a detailed list of professors and students from Salamanca in the Indies (1534-1585) 
see Pereña, L. La Escuela de Salamanca. Proceso a la Conquista de America, Salamanca, 1986, 
pp. 216-255.
110) Astrain, A. “Los españoles en el Concilio de Trento”, Razón y Fe, IV, p. 319. 
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Vitoria is among the first thinkers who showed a concern for this bonum 
commune of the whole world. As Lesaffer points out, the sovereign princes 
were the highest secular authorities within the Totus Orbis: “By consequence, 
they were expected not only to enforce their own interests and rights under 
the ius gentium, but also to enforce the law of nations within the Totus 
Orbis in general”. Thus, in the preambles to the peace treaties, the princes 
declared themselves to be responsible for the highest goals of Christianity 
as a whole”.111
In regards to the Amerindians, the School’s concerns on the affairs of 
Indies influenced policy formation and helped to give a humane dimension 
to the legal instruments of dominion. Their critical voice in the Old World, 
together with that of the Orders in the New World influenced policy design 
and the enactment of legislation. Three years after De Indis, and six years 
before Vitoria’s death, a Junta was convened by Charles V to promulgate 
the New Laws of Indies (1542). According to Pagden, the “changing tone” of 
this legislation regulating the Crown’s relationship with both the colonialists 
and the Indians, and “the numerous, if ultimately ineffective attempts to 
curb the activities to prevent further atrocities”, suggests that the Salamanca 
theologians “voiced their views to some effect in the influential circles where 
they moved”.112 Certainly, it had more than some effect. That legislation 
would simply not have come about without the formal constructions of 
those men. 
In consequence, half a century after Columbus reached La Española, the 
controversy was growing among those who were aware of the affairs of Indies 
and thus accurate fact determination was becoming a major concern.113 In 
fact, Charles V decided to arrange a series of debates at the Royal Court of 
Valladolid in 1550 and 1551 between Juan Ginés de Sepulveda, who backed 
the status quo and Bartolomé de Las Casas, who pleaded for change.114 The 
final objective of those debates was to clarify several major issues concerning 
111) Lesaffer, R. “Peace treaties from Lodi to Westphalia”. Peace Treaties and International law 
in European History, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 32-33 (emphasis added).
112) Pagden, A. Spanish Imperialism and the political imagination. Studies in European and 
Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513-1830, Yale University Press, 1990, p. 25.
113) Hernandez, R. “The internationalization … op. cit. 1044.
114) Abril-Castelló, V. “La bipolarización Sepúlveda-Las Casas y sus consecuencias: la revolu-
ción de la duodécima réplica”, La ética de la conquista de América, CSIC, 1984, pp. 229-288
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the Amerindians. Vitoria’s disciple de Soto played a part in this politically 
sensitive contest as one of the theologians in charge of compiling the official 
summary of the discussions.
In the meantime, while the State apparatus was searching for answers, 
the encomenderos and their social networks were already challenging the 
New Laws of Burgos with civil disobedience, revolts, armed opposition 
and killings of public representatives in the Indies. In the end, Charles V 
was more compelled by these events than by the arguments of theologians, 
public officials and missionaries such as Jacobo de Tastera, Zumárraga (first 
Bishop of México) or Marroquín (first Bishop of Guatemala), among others. 
As a result, a weaker version of the New Laws was issued in 1552. 
The experience of the Spanish in the Indies affected later conquests by 
other groups and nations, beginning with North America. Several aspects of 
the Spanish project of evangelization and conquest, as well as the arguments 
and legal titles challenging the Conquest, were replicated for the British 
colony of Virginia. In the words of Elliot, the same “providential mission” 
was pursued. In fact, the Pamphlet for the Virginia Enterprise written by 
the elder Richard Hakluyt reads as follows: “we may, if we will proceed with 
extremity, conquer, fortify, and plant in soils most sweet, most pleasant, 
most strong, and most fertile, and in the end bring them all in subjection 
and to civility”.115 
Thus, the 1606 charter of a joint-stock company (The Virginia Company) 
and the “contract” of Cristobal Colón with Isabella and Ferdinand (Las 
Capitulaciones)116 share a similar evangelizing component. In the words of 
Richard Hakluyt in his Discourse of Western Planting (1585), “Now the King 
and Queens of England have the name of Defenders of the faith; by which 
title I think they are not only charged to maintain and patronize the faith of 
Christ, but also to enlarge and advance the same”.117 William Crashaw argued 
115) Elliot, J.H. Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830, Yale 
University Press, 2006, p. 11 and 35. 
116) See Pérez-Prendes, J.M. “Los criterios jurídicos de Cristóbal Colón”, Congreso de Historia 
del descubrimiento (1492-1556), Actas de la Real Academia de la Historia, III, 1992, pp. 450-
480 and Pérez-Prendes, J.M. “Sobre la naturaleza jurídica de las llamadas capitulaciones de 
Santa Fe”, El reino de Granada y el nuevo mundo, Diputación Provincial de Granada, 1994, 
pp. 45-59.
117) On the promotional role of the two Richard Hakluyts see Schmidt Horning, S. “The 
Power of Image: Promotional Literature and Its Changing Role in the Settlement of Early 
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the same idea in a sermon of 1610 before the Virginia Company, clearly 
borrowing from Vitoria the idea of a universal right conferred by the law of 
peoples to freedom of trade and communication (ius communicationis).118 
Thus certain elements of cultural analogy and normative transplant in rela-
tion to Spain are present in the conquest of America; and a critical intellectual 
replication is evident as well. In the words of Robert Gray, the Chaplain to 
the Virginia Company, in his pamphlet A Good Speed to Virginia (1609): 
by what right or warrant can we enter into the lands of these savages, take away their 
rightful inheritance from them, and plant ourselves in their places being unwronged 
or unprovoked by them?119 
In conclusion, Vitoria and his colleagues, along with critical missionaries in 
the Indies, had some impact on other cases of evangelization and conquest. 
In fact, it could not reasonably have been otherwise: human beings tend 
to approach social interaction by analogy almost intuitively, considering 
previous models and patterns of behaviour. In short, any initial socialization 
between peoples tends to be based primarily on precedent. 
6.  Progress and the Legal Mind
Moving beyond the intellectual frontier of the Old World, the modes of 
conventional thinking had to be abandoned. Naturally then, these men 
of moral and religious conviction were not free of doubts, vagueness and 
self-contradiction, as their texts evidence. However, this process of formal 
“doubting” or questioning is the most important intellectual contribution 
to progress, especially in the questioning of the world-wide exercise of power 
through the (de)legitimizing vehicle of theology. From this questioning of 
power, a conception was developed to deal with an unexpected New World: 
universalism. 
The blackfriar also deserves credit for two other major contributions. First, 
his ideas contributed to a shift in the direction of the policies of the European 
Empire of Charles V, a unique power structure that, together with the Holy 
Carolina”, 70 North Carolina Historical Review 4 (1993): 365-400.
118) Elliott, J.H. Empires of the Atlantic World … op. cit. p. 49.
119) Elliott, J.H. Empires of the Atlantic World … op. cit. p. 41. 
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Church, had nurtured aspirations towards unlimited expansion. Vitoria’s 
universalist ideas ultimately refuted the claims to universal jurisdiction of 
both the Emperor and the Pope. Secondly, and directly connected to this, 
his ideas put powerful concepts into circulation that would help others to 
conceive of an alternative legal world within a single secular and consensual 
framework. This idea slowly began to take shape and develop through the 
initial systematizations of legal thinkers such as Grotius, Gentili and others. 
Francisco de Vitoria, being a friar and a theologian of the 16th century, 
could hardly have avoided applying the cultural parameters and values of 
Western (Christian) civilization to the Amerindians.120 Thus, paraphrasing 
Cavallar, Vitoria’s moral cosmopolitanism, while incomplete, was still an 
impressive feat.121 The Dominican was cleaving a wedge into conventional 
thinking not only with new ideas but doubts and questions. His rational 
questioning exemplifies a subtle and important shift in the evolution of 
modern thought. In this regard, the formalization of such doubts is a clear 
manifestation of Renaissance thinking; the age of reason was dawning and 
rationalism was on the rise. 
The geographical and social reality of the American Indies posed an ur-
gent quaestio facti and quaestio iuris that would help to unlock the door to 
modernity. Many arguments in Vitoria’s lectios and relectios discuss grounds 
that might provide legal justification for one thing or another. In his texts, 
he rejected some while accepting others with caution and reservation. Even 
legal titles such as those concerning the tutelage of the Amerindians were, 
in his own words, mentioned for the sake of the argument but not asserted 
with confidence. In sum, the emergence of doubts and their interaction 
with facts (versus beliefs) is one of the important steps towards modernity. 
Partly because of this, the ideas of the blackfriar have been the object of an 
enormous amount of secondary literature. 
The study of his philosophy poses critical questions from both an epis-
temological and historical standpoint in turn. To start with, Vitoria was a 
man of Scholastic thought, certainly of a renovated variety but, nonetheless, 
a mode of thinking within structural constraints. Under the overarching 
120) For both the protestant and “Norman Yoke” discourse on the American Indians see 
Williams, R.A. The American Indian in Western Legal Thought. The Discourses of Conquest, 
Oxford University Press, 1992 (parts II and III).
121) Cavallar, G. “Vitoria, Grotius, … op. cit. p. 188.
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territories as well. Certainly, Isabel of Castile had an interest in interpret-
ing the bull the second way. As she stated clearly in her Codicilio, she had 
obtained dominion. 
The legal elites attendant on the Crown used a clear line of argument 
to legitimate the king’s dominion of the New World: the Pope, by his 
Plenitudo Potestatis had granted the lands of the “barbarians” to the Crown 
of Castile. However, for Vitoria, papal bulls did not constitute solid legal 
grounding. The friar was probably not ignorant of the fact that members of 
the Roman Curia were all too familiar with the practice of selling political 
favours, in the same manner as those electors who had granted Charles V 
the title of Holy Roman Emperor (thanks to the letters of credit from the 
Fugger bankers).122 
Francisco de Vitoria’s main arguments challenging the supreme power of 
the Pope in the Indies are as follows: 1) the Pope has no universal dominium 
by natural, divine law, or human law; 2) even if he had such a dominium, 
he could not transfer it to a secular power; 3) the Pope’s temporal power is 
restricted to purely spiritual matters; and 4) the Pope has no temporal power 
over the Indians. In short, Vitoria rejected, in the first two Relectios, the claim 
that the Pope has temporal jurisdiction above all princes, and declared, in 
his fifth Relectio, that the Pope was not the temporal master of the world. 
Yet the idea of “Empire” was very appealing to some of the most powerful 
families (dynasties) controlling Old Europe. For the Habsburg, the Valois, 
and other dynastic European families, the expansion of the Roman Empire 
and the imperial coronation of Charlemagne (800) had nurtured a dream 
of power and dominion. However, it was the Habsburg dynasty that won 
the greatest prize of all: the Monarchia Universalis. According to Lesaffer, 
“Charles V may have been the last emperor to be able to aspire to secular 
supremacy over the other ‘sovereign’ princes”.123 
The monarch had managed to be appointed successor to the Roman 
Caesars and thus, the secular leader of Christianity. The legal basis for this 
grand plan could only be gradually de-legitimized by institutions such as 
university faculties. Francisco de Vitoria was among those professors who 
publicly opposed that unlimited concentration of power. His conference 
122) For a detailed study of the relationship of Charles V with the financial community see 
Carande, R. Carlos V y sus Banqueros (3 volumes), Crítica, 1990.
123) Lesaffer, R., “Peace treaties … op. cit. p. 32.
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entitled De potestate civili (1528) is particularly direct in this regard. But it 
is a letter to a friend of his that best captures his strict position in regard 
to unchecked power: “To the King … Don Fernando was called simply 
“Your Mercy”; but now is called “Your Majesty” and “Holy Caesar”; noth-
ing remains but to say he is God”.124
In considering the limits of public power, Francisco de Vitoria admitted 
several forms of dominion (dominium) valid to its legitimate exercise: unde 
illa distinctio iuristarum, dominium altum bassum, directum utile, merum 
mixtum. But while accepting those 1) high, 2) low, 3) direct, 4) useful, 5) 
pure (merum) and 6) mixed dominions, the blackfriar rejected that Charles 
V was Emperor of the All the World: imperator non est dominus totius orbis. 
And, even if Charles V were indeed Emperor of All the World (dato quod 
imperator esset…), he could not in any case abrogate private property rights. 
These positions certainly constitute an intellectual public challenge. They 
gave shape to potentially dangerous ideas for the status quo. In consequence, 
the censoring of these ideas, so explicitly mandated in an imperial letter 
to the prior of San Esteban (1539), would be strongly enforced by the state 
apparatus and the power elites of the Court. As a result, the Relectios of 
Francisco de Vitoria would have to wait to see the light of day in print until 
Charles V had died and, even then, the first edition had to be printed in 
France. Thus the first edition of his conferences came to light in Lyon (1557) 
at the publishing house of Jacques Boyer. After that, there was a succession of 
editions disseminated all around Europe, in Salamanca (1565), Lyon (fourth 
edition, 1587), Antwerp (1604), Venice (1626), Salamanca (1680), Cologne 
(1696), Madrid (1765), etc.
The prohibition against publication, in the end, had not been able to 
contain the spread of those ideas but only to slow it down. In fact, the 
ideas were widely disseminated by spoken word and transcripts. Although 
Charles V had tried to inhibit this, he lacked the means to prevent informal 
communications and relationships (decentralized dissemination of manu-
script copies by his disciples and students). The classroom had provided 
the blackfriar with a uniquely powerful channel of communication with 
the future elites of Spain, many of whom were educated in the University 
of Salamanca and had informal access to those ideas. As a result, the politi-
cal importance of these Relectios in de-legitimizing the status quo was clear. 
124) See Vitoria, F. Comentarios a la Secunda secundae … op. cit. 
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The power elites made efforts to contain the impact of De Indis; from 
the original prohibition to express those ideas in public by formal letter 
of Charles V to the later process to include Vitoria’s works in the Index of 
Forbidden Books by Pope Sixtus V (1590).125 But there was a more subtle 
action taken that deserves to be mentioned: the authenticity (/authorship) of 
the words attributed to the blackfriar was formally questioned by Francisco 
de la Peña (1608), a member of the faculty of Law at Bologne and also of 
the Sacred Tribunal of the Roman Rota, as there was no ‘official’ published 
version of De Indis.126
7.  A Religious Moderate
The Flemish humanist Nicolaus Clenardus (Cleynaerts), a professor of Greek 
at the University of Salamanca from 1531 to 1537, offers us a good portrait 
of Francisco de Vitoria. In his collected correspondence, published in Ant-
werpen (1566), Cleynaerts describes the admiration that Vitoria enjoyed 
among his academic peers. In one of these letters, from 1534, Cleynaerts 
writes to Johannes Vaseus about Vitoria: “[a man] of admirable simplic-
ity; he has a singular love for scholars…You may not easily glean all of his 
qualities, because his erudition is quite vast, and yet, he does not glory in 
it”. Vaseus agreed, describing Vitoria as a man of “incredible erudition and 
almost unlimited reading”, concluding with this reflection: “this would he 
have left in evidence, had he been as zealous to write as he was capable of 
extraordinary mastery to do so” (1540-1541). And one last appraisal deserves 
repeating here: 
The fame of his erudition is great in France and Spain … I know no one, even among 
those who have spent their life writing in Latin, whose letters have given me so much 
pleasure as the many [I have] received from Vitoria. If one day, he finally decides to 
write, this man’s fame will encompass the scholarly world. Salamanca is ignorant of 
the treasure she has in our Vitoria.127
125) Godman, P. The Saint as Censor: Robert Bellarmine between Inquisition and Index, BRILL, 
2000, pp. 136-138.
126) Vitoria, F, Relectio de iure belli o paz dinámica: escuela española de la paz, primera generación 
1526-1560, Edition by Luciano Pereña Ed, CSIC, 1981, p. 82.
127) Roersch, A. La Correspondence de Nicolas Clenard, Palais des Académies, 1940-1941, vol.I, 
p. 38, p. 133 and pp. 225-226.
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Being such a respected intellectual figure, it is puzzling that he never pub-
lished his work, except for some prefaces from his early years in Paris. The 
blackfriar certainly had nothing against publishing. In fact, he actively 
participated in procuring one of the first university presses in Spain, and 
many of his disciples did publish their works during his lifetime. We can 
only guess that Vitoria was simply dedicated exclusively to his teaching, a 
vocation that he performed with outstanding success. According to Melchor 
Cano, “Master Vitoria may have disciples wiser than he, but ten of the most 
learned cannot teach like him”; or even in the friar’s own words, “Master 
Astudillo knows more than I, but he cannot sell it as well as I can.”128 
The friar’s was a unique academically driven personality. Characterized 
by hard work and austerity, this disposition appears to have been formed in 
his early years as a student and professor in Paris. In a preface to the works 
of Peter Crockart, in 1514, Vitoria reveals his devotion to the academic life: 
“after many years spent in writing, in teaching, in debating, when by sur-
plus of rights you could have chosen a more restful life”.129 This praise for 
Crockart would be fitting to his own later life. In fact, on several occasions, 
his health broke down from working so hard that his superiors had to make 
special accommodations for his classes due to his deteriorating health. A 
remarkable illustration of both his devotion for teaching and his students’ 
devotion to him is the fact that in his last days, due to illness, he was carried 
from San Esteban to the university lecture rooms on his students’ shoulders. 
Besides being a man committed to academia, he was an example of 
moderation for his time. He taught the value of moderation to his pupils 
and disciples and even expounded on its importance in a Relectio under the 
title, On Moderation (De Temperantia). The conference, concerned in part 
with the affairs of the Indies, was presented to the academic community 
two years before De Indis (1539). As a direct result of his personal advocacy 
for intellectual temperance, this has been one of the underlying values 
permeating the work of the School of Salamanca. 
Melchor Cano expressly refers to the learned friar as “a moderate” in 
his masterpiece on the ten sources of theological proof: “vir erat ille natura 
ipsa moderatus”. In this contribution to theological positivism, De Locis 
Theologicis Libri XII (1563), Cano reflected on the need to limit the weight 
128) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit., p. 66.
129) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit., p. 31.
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that authority is given in academic thought. To support this point, Cano, 
who became the Chair of Theology after the death of Vitoria, recalled that 
his Master (Vitoria) taught his disciples not to take Thomas Aquinas’ own 
words at face value without proper analysis: “and though he was a man 
of moderate character, he at times dissented from Thomas Aquinas, and 
garnered greater praise in his dissenting than in consenting.”
However, the process of unlocking the gates to modernity would not be 
easy. It was precisely at the time that Vitoria obtained the Chair of Theol-
ogy in 1526 that some of Erasmus’ ideas were being publicly challenged in 
Spain. At that time, he was required to participate in the Junta of Valladolid 
(1527), a conference for theologians with the purpose of assessing the accept-
ability of the Erasmus’s ideas. The meeting was convened by the General 
Inquisitor Alonso Manrique, an Erasmist himself. Particularly interested 
in having Vitoria present at the Junta, he asked the university authorities 
that they allow Vitoria to attend “for some days, which will not be many” 
(May 22, 1527). The sessions took place from June to August of 1527 with 
the purpose of discussing “some matters touching on service to God and 
the welfare of our holy Catholic faith”.130 
Notwithstanding the secrecy of the proceedings, the Dutch humanist and 
his circle received many clues about who was saying what in these sessions, 
thanks to the group of Erasmist professors participating in the Junta. As the 
conference was a major concern for Erasmus and his supporters, they fol-
lowed the proceedings with keen attention and lobbied to avoid a negative 
determination, an interesting example of early intellectual diplomacy. The 
first reference to Vitoria to appear in the correspondence of the Erasmists 
was in a letter from the humanist Luis Vives to Erasmus himself, explaining 
that the blackfriar would have a sympathetic position toward his texts (June 
13, 1527). In that letter, the author of Adversus pseudodialecticos compared 
Vitoria’s character with that of his brother (Diego de Vitoria), who also 
participated in the sessions: 
Diego has a brother quite different from him, Francisco de Vitoria, who is also a 
Dominican, and a theologian in Paris. He is an individual of the greatest renown and 
esteem amongst his brothers. Remember that on more than one occasion he defended 
your cause before different conferences of theologians in Paris. He is very skilful in 
these scholarly arguments. 
130) Getino, L.G. El Maestro Fr … op. cit., p. 92 and 105.
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During his early years as student in Paris, Francisco de Vitoria had had 
regular contact with Vives as well as exposure to the ideas of Erasmus and 
his circle of friends and supporters.131 To reassure Erasmus about the high 
esteem that Vitoria held towards him, Vives added, “he admires and adores 
you”.132 Thus, Erasmus decided to send a letter to Vitoria on November 
29, of 1527 under this heading: Letter to a certain Spanish theologian from 
the Sorbonne. 
The Dutch thinker’s letter attempted to discover what position Vitoria 
would take in these sessions. Erasmus complained that the assembly was 
“examining in a scholastic and Sorbonnian way something of purely rhetori-
cal value”. However, he appealed to Vitoria’s “dignity” and expressed the 
importance of the determination by writing, “the world expects something 
extraordinary of this Assembly of theologians”. Finally, Erasmus added that 
in that regard the world would have more reason to thank the theologian 
than “Erasmus himself ”. 
It is not clear when these words reached Vitoria. In any case, they would 
not have had much significance because the sessions were suspended due 
to an outbreak of plague in Valladolid. From what can be deduced from 
the letter, Erasmus was certain that Manrique intended to reopen the ses-
sions in the future. In the end, however, this did not happen; we can only 
guess what would have resulted from the proceedings had they continued. 
Bataillon has noted that Juan Maldonado, in a letter to Erasmus, referred 
to a friar whom he did not name, a very wise Dominican who had played 
a major role in the assembly, and of whom he complained since sometimes 
the said friar had deemed that the works of Erasmus would benefit from the 
deletion of certain lines, and yet other lines he would condemn to the fire. 
For Bataillon, the Dominican in question was in all probability Vitoria.133
There are several transcripts of what Vitoria said in those sessions. The 
following are his conclusions on those statements of Erasmus which he was 
required to review: 
131) Villoslada, R. La Universidad de Paris durante los estudios de Francisco de Vitoria, Univer-
sidad Gregoriana, Rome, 1938.
132) Vives, J.L. Epistolario (José Jiménez Delgado Ed), Editora Nacional, 1978, p. 466.
133) Bataillon, M. Erasmo y España. Estudios sobre la historia espiritual del Siglo XVI, Madrid, 
1979, p. 274.
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It is quite possible that all those sayings for which Erasmus is reproached were un-
derstood by him in the most catholic [general] sense; and this may be believed. But 
nothing good can be expected from them for the consolidation of the faith … and it 
is imperative that such matters be prevented from spreading by word of mouth, which 
cannot be done but by suppressing those sayings of Erasmus and others like them … 
and I believe Erasmus himself will not take it badly that I said so.134 
Conscious of his own auctoritas as the newly elected Chair of Theology at 
Salamanca, Vitoria expressed himself with caution and moderation.135 This 
attitude is particularly praiseworthy in an academic that had certainly read 
Erasmus’ mocking opinions on theology (the method) and theologians (the 
men): for most of the Erasmists, paraphrasing Rico, the theological method 
was “an idol to be demolished”.136 In fact, Erasmus’ assertions on theology 
and theologians were vitriolic from the first word of chapter 53 in Stultitiae 
laus (In Praise of Joy, 1511), a book conceived in 1509 while he was a guest 
in the home of his friend Thomas More: 
Then there are the theologians, a remarkably supercilious and touchy lot. I might 
perhaps do better to pass over them in silence without “stirring the mud of Camarina” 
or grasping that noxious plant, lest they marshal their forces for an attack with in-
numerable conclusions and force me to eat my words.
To paraphrase Bernice Hamilton, the tendency of the School of Salamanca 
was, “to try and incorporate Renaissance scholarship into a Scholastic 
framework”, unlike the followers of Erasmus, “who wished to abolish the 
scholastic method altogether”.137 In consequence, the theologians invited to 
participate in the sessions by the Erasmist Manrique were not only critical 
with the substantive content of works such as Erasmus’s Enchiridion but also 
demanding due respect from this humanist. The Dutchman had mocked 
their entire academic world, and so they probably considered these sessions 
as an opportunity to send a message across the table to the Erasmists. 
134) Bataillon, M. Erasmo y España … op. cit., p. 255 (emphasis added).
135) In fact, he made a more severe judgement in his classes. See Beltrán de Heredia, V. Los 
manuscritos … op. cit. p. 43.
136) Rico, F. El Sueño del Humanismo: De Petrarca a Erasmo, Alianza, 1993, p. 118.
137) Hamilton, B. Political Thought … op. cit. p. 174.
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8.  The Man in Context
Francisco de Vitoria was a theologian concerned with finding answers to 
the urgent questions of his time. In order to do so, the blackfriar had to 
confront and clarify some of his intellectual doubts on the one hand, and to 
question certain elements of the status quo, on the other. This probing spirit, 
for a man who was born in the time of the Reconquista of Al-Andalus, raised 
in the culture of the Catholic Kings, attached to a religious order (Ordo 
Praedicatorum), and trained as a theologian in the old scholastic tradition, 
is indeed remarkable. For this reason, his intellectual biography is a perfect 
case study on the limits and conditions of academic development in the 
transition to modernity.138
A significant portion of early contemporary studies on Francisco de 
Vitoria has focused on the international legal aspects of his thinking. 
Unfortunately, this has too often been done by simply adapting doctrines 
of the past to present day categories of international law.139 According to 
Pagden, “by re-describing the battles of the early modern terms, by making 
Francisco de Vitoria the remote ancestor of the Charter of the United Na-
tions or the Bill of Rights, the specificity of the conflict is lost, and with it 
the possibility of its significance as a process over time”.140 As a result, for 
example, some contemporary literature on the subject attributes to the friar 
the doctrinal origins of the United Nations,141 some depicts him as a figure 
of economic liberalism,142 and some links his ius communicationis with the 
regulation of telecommunications satellites.143 
Obviously, there is a risk of de-contextualization when classifying circum-
stances of the past under concepts and measures pertaining to the modern 
138) For a characterization of the friar as a “traditional intellectual in the gramscian sense” 
see Barbier, M. “La notion de respublica chez Vitoria”, Aspects de la pensée médiévale … pp. 
100-101.
139) See particularly Pérez Luño, A.E. La polémica … op. cit., p. 31.
140) Pagden, A. The Uncertainties of Empire: Essays in Iberian and Ibero-American History, 
Aldershot, 1944, p. x.
141) Hernandez, R. Un español en la ONU. Francisco de Vitoria, 1977. 
142) Urdanoz, T. “Síntesis teológico-jurídica de la doctrina de Vitoria”, Corpus Hispanorum 
de Pace, Vol.V, CSIC, 1967, pp. XLIII-CXLII.
143) Desantes, J.M. “El jius communicationis según Vitoria y la regulación de los satélites de 
difusión directa”, 7 Atlántida 47 (1970): 471-489.
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legal culture. However, some of those early contemporary efforts have drawn 
attention to the blackfriar in present academic literature. As a result, there 
is a healthy amount of work being done today on Vitoria. At this stage, 
we may push forward to understand not only his contributions but also to 
trace the development of contemporary modes of thinking embodied in 
his texts (i.e: internal coherence, logical deduction, etc).
However, in order to do so, it is necessary to highlight and expose, rather 
than minimize or suppress, some of the inner contradictions in Vitorias’s 
thinking. In this regard, there has been a certain over-emphasis on the cutting 
edge character of his ideas. Just one example is his position on the treat-
ment of black Africans in comparison with that of the American Indians. 
Although he clearly expressed his indignation with regard to the treatment 
of the Indians, Vitoria had no objections with respect to the Portuguese 
African slave trade. In a private letter of 1546 to Bernardino de Piqué (with 
18 March as probable date), Vitoria writes: “if [the Africans] were treated 
humanely, they would be better off as slaves under the Christians, than 
being free in their own lands”.144 
Evidence such as the letter mentioned above has led the historian Pagden 
to hold that Vitoria “was far from being the ‘humanist’ that many histori-
ans have attempted to make of him”.145 But what then was the blackfriar 
really: a humanist of lower ‘quality’ or ‘rank’? It is ultimately of little value 
to ‘grade’ the intellectual performance of a thinker according to the mould 
of a cultural canon. Vitoria was certainly a humanist thinker. However, 
the nucleus of his philosophy lies at the intersection of the Doctrinal tra-
dition of the Middle Ages and the budding phenomenon of Humanism. 
In consequence, we should expect to find dissonances in his work, as his 
ideas were formed by two ways of conceiving the world, spanning old 
sources of authority and new conceptions, as well as developing mediations 
between the two. In sum, the richness of his social reality does not fit a 
single cultural mould. Francisco de Vitoria gave form to his ideas within 
a vibrant cultural acquis that mixed humanism with the intellectual legacy 
of the Middle Ages. 
144) Beltrán de Heredia, V “Carta de Fray Francisco de Vitoria al padre Fray Bernardino de 
Vique, Colección de dictámenes inéditos”, 43 Ciencia Tomista (1931): 173-174. 
145) Pagden, A. The fall of natural man … op. cit., p. 60.
44
             
One of the friar’s major intellectual contributions was applying reason 
and imagination to the wealth of both classical and Christian culture.146 
From that rich combination he tackled several major issues while cutting 
through the limits of the conventional thinking of his era, the geographic 
borders of his political community and the legal prerogatives of the Euro-
pean power structures of his time. With that kind of intellectual intensity, 
Vitoria reflects that Spain obsessed with personal dignity and a zeal for the 
Absolute so accurately portrayed by De los Rios.147 It is this characteristic 
posture that gave rise to the Seconda Scolastica of the Spanish golden age, 
which was essentially a group of men searching for answers to some of the 
great questions and problems of their time by reengineering the authorita-
tive source of the status quo: theology. 
Vitoria and his disciples were necessarily children of two modes of con-
ception, faith and reason, in search of a compromise, however complex; 
besides being scholars, they were members of an Order (Ordo Praedicatorum) 
devoted to preaching the gospel around the world. Although the Domini-
cans were among the more advanced religious organizations of his time, 
they were nevertheless part of a religious order, which, by definition, pays 
tribute to a predetermined something/someone, a (revealed) ‘truth’, a god, 
as opposed to knowledge and reason. However, in spite of this limitation, 
many conceptions that would be instrumental to the future improvement 
of social life, or “progress”, can be traced back to their texts and lectures. 
“Progress” itself was beginning to take form as an idea both inside and 
outside of academia in the 16th century. In the words of the historian Mar-
avall: “the doctrines of the men of the Enlightenment, in the 18th century, 
did not arise suddenly, without antecedents, but rather, conditioned by 
economic and social circumstances, respond to a long process, sometimes 
centuries long, and make use of theoretical elements from long before in their 
construction”.148 The road towards the Enlightenment was being paved in 
Spain in the 16th century by such works as Cristóbal de Villalón’s Ingeniosa 
comparación de lo antiguo con lo presente (1539) and Pedro Mexía’s Silva de 
146) Truyol, A. Historia … op. cit., p. 80.
147) De los Rios, F. “Religión y Estado en la España del Siglo XVI (1926)”, Obras Completas, 
Volumen II, Anthropos, 1997, p. 484. 
148) Maravall, J.A. Antiguos y Modernos: La idea de progreso en el desarrollo inicial de una 
sociedad, Sociedad de Estudios y Publicaciones, 1966, p. 611.
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varia Lección (1540)149 among many others including the theologians from 
Salamanca. 
As Fernando de los Rios pointed out in his 1927 conferences at Colum-
bia University, the battle between Catholicism and Protestantism (and its 
concomitant religious wars) impinged severely on the objectivity of the 
writing of European history.150 In fact, Francisco de Vitoria almost vanishes 
from the history of ideas for three centuries due to the distorting effect in 
academia of the wars of religion, as well as the notorious practices of Empire 
and the resulting black legend about Spain. Fortunately, his memory has 
been recovered thanks to the seminal works of the Belgian Ernest Nys (1851-
1920) and the American James Brown Scott (1866-1943), among others. In 
any case, while there have been great advances in the historical treatment 
of his ideas and his school, many interesting issues merit further research. 
One of them is certainly the controversy over the contribution of Span-
ish Scholasticism to the collective construction of human rights. It stands 
to reason that making connections between the School of Salamanca and 
human rights is a matter of controversy; “human rights” is one of the 
‘crown jewels’ of modern legal theory. However, it is clear that several of the 
master-values of European civilization that underlie the ideas of such think-
ers as Vitoria and other theologians did have extensive impact on the slow, 
collective formation of the doctrine of human rights; these include: 1) the 
unity of mankind, 2) the dignity of all men, and 3) equality among people. 
It is difficult to imagine how those values, derived from basic cultural 
and religious postulates, could be denied a position in the history of human 
rights. This cultural and religious acquis nurtured the theological idea of 
natural law and thus paved the way for the development of the doctrine of 
human rights in the following centuries. Thus, the contribution of Vitoria 
and his disciples to the formation of the doctrine of human rights is em-
bedded in that acquis and derives from natural legal thought. The original 
doctrines of these influential theologians, and other contemporary and 
later European thinkers up to the 17th century, would pave the way for 
the progressive rationalization in the 18th century, the formalization in the 
149) Mexía, P. Silva de varia lección. Ed. Bibliófilos Españoles, vol.1, 1933-1934, p. 110.
150) De los Rios, F. “Religión y Estado en la España del Siglo XVI (1926)”, Obras Completas, 
Volumen II, Anthropos, 1997, p. 485.
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19th century, and finally the legalization in the 20th century of the idea of 
human rights.
9.  Critical Interpretations
Two centuries after Charles V adopted the motto Plus Ultra (1516), foreshad-
owing the extension of his rule beyond the ‘pillars of Hercules’ (Gibraltar) to 
the New World, Giovanni Battista Tiepolo painted The Apotheosis of Spain 
(1764) on the ceiling of the Throne Room at the Royal Palace in Madrid.151 
The fresco allegorically depicts the Spanish monarchy as a voluptuous 
woman with the ‘pillars of Hercules’ on one side and a hooded man on the 
other, along with other elements including Moors and Indians. The painting 
ostensibly celebrates the glory of Spain.
Almost two centuries later, the ceiling of one of the Halls of the Palace des 
Nations (Geneva) was painted by Jose María Sert with a decidedly different 
take: The Lesson of Salamanca (1935-1936). The mural basically depicts five 
colossi (the five continents) uniting their hands. On one side of the mural, 
the blackfriar and other professors are in discussion surrounded by atten-
tive and studious disciples. In the classic Spanish tradition of burlesque, the 
composition includes a considerable number of donkeys standing amongst 
the scholars, by which we are meant to understand that some did not ad-
equately grasp the lesson.
This later mural was unveiled in October 1936, three months after the 
Spanish Civil War had begun in prelude to World War II. After the night-
mare of that world war and the fall of fascism in most parts of Europe except 
Spain, a radical revamping of the institutional structures of international 
law was invoked. At that moment, the idea of a world political community 
with common rules for all shone brightly as a necessary collective project 
for a post-war world (i.e: rules on the use of force). As a result, the figure of 
Francisco de Vitoria became both a moral and political point of reference 
for a whole new generation of men called on to construct a new interna-
tional legal order. 
After some quasi-hagiographic studies during that time, the blackfriar 
finally entered into the realm of standard historical analysis. The work of 
151) See i.e, Rosenthal, E. “Plus ultra, non plus ultra, and the Columnar Device of Emperor 
Charles V” 34 Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes (1971): 204-228.
47
            
international legal historians such as Antonio Truyol y Serra (1913-2003) de-
serves mention in this regard. However, although the period of hagiographic 
eulogies is over, the standardization of historiographical approaches to the 
study of Vitoria is still incomplete. In fact, there is a whole new trend of 
historical revisionism producing studies that frame Vitoria in a diametrically 
opposite vein to those previous exercises. In these studies, the blackfriar is 
used as the springboard for an ‘alternative history of international law’; the 
idea behind this new interpretation is simple but rather stunning: Francisco 
de Vitoria is the first legitimizer of colonialism and a key intellectual figure 
behind the “colonial origins of international law”.
This approach has been taken by several recent studies. Henry Mechoulan, 
for example, argues that all of Vitoria’s arguments can be summarized in 
two imperatives: 1) that the Spanish have exclusive title to the despoilment 
of Amerindian wealth and 2) the right and duty to see to the salvation of 
Amerindian souls. In the striking words of this author, the Dominican’s 
“real genius” is the “art of camouflaging the justification of a fact –coloniza-
tion– by appealing to ‘interhuman sociability”.152 
Other critical arguments on Vitoria can be found in the field of Ameri-
can Indian legal studies. For example, in his book The American Indian in 
Western Legal Thought, Richard Williams defines “Victoria” (sic) as “the 
first articulator of a European discourse of conquest founded on secularly 
rationalizable norms and values”. In the opinion of this author, the black-
friar “justified the extension of Western power over the American Indians 
as an imperative of the European’s vision of truth”.153 However, it is easy to 
agree with Cavallar that the totalizing “Western legal discourse” assumed 
by Williams incurs in “the fallacy of another great narrative” by constructing 
“a meta-narrative of modern history”.154 
Many of these studies are connected with the literature of the so-called 
Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL).155 As Mutua points 
out, the raison d’etre of TWAIL takes form from, among other sources, a 
152) Mechoulan, H. “Vitoria, pére du droit international? … op. cit., p. 25 (emphasis added).
153) Williams, R.A. The American Indian in Western Legal Thought … op. cit. p. 106 and 107.
154) See Cavallar, G. “Vitoria, Grotius … op. cit. 207 (emphasis added).
155) Snyder, F.E. and Sathirathai, S. (eds), Third World Attitudes Towards International Law, 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
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much quoted passage by Mohamed Bedjaoui:156 “classical international law 
… consisted of a set of rules with a geographical bias (it was a European 
law), a religious-ethical aspiration (it was a Christian law), an economic 
motivation (it was a mercantilist law), and political aims (it was an imperialist 
law)”.157 Under this rationale, international law is “premised on Europe as 
the centre, Christianity as the basis for civilization, capitalism as innate in 
humans, and imperialism as a necessity”.158 The broad argument of these 
studies is that international law is an inherently imperialist construct which 
stretches from the 16th century to the present day. 
The works of Antony Anghie are a good example of this post-modern 
narrative. This former student and research assistant of Christopher Weera-
mantry began writing on international law and colonialism in an article 
(The Heart of my home, 1993) that resulted from their participation in the 
Nauru Commission of Inquiry (1986):159 
Colonialism … reproduces itself through its victims and continuously creates and 
represses new subjects. In this way, colonialism is like sovereignty itself. This is a chal-
lenge for international lawyers, whose craft inevitably demands the articulation and 
reproduction of the language of sovereignty and with it, perhaps, the suppressions and 
exclusions that characterize its history.160 
Searching for a strong thesis, as candidate for S.J.D. at that time, he was per-
haps over-reaching in his use of the old friar’s texts: “Vitoria’s work illustrates 
the centrality of the colonial encounter for the formation of international 
law and its key doctrines, showing the ways in which international law 
characterizes, excludes and disciplines peoples and societies understood as 
156) Mutua, M. “What is TWAIL?”, 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31, 
April (2000): 31-40.
157) Bedjaoui, M. “Poverty of the international order”, International law: A Contemporary 
Perspective, R. Falk, F. Kratochwil and S. Mendlovitz Eds, 1985, p. 153 (emphasis added).
158) See Mutua, M. “What is …op. cit. p. 33 (emphasis added). For the so-called “post-colonial 
scholarship” and its foundational literature see, in particular, Said, E. Orientalism, Pantheon 
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different and alien”.161 Starting as the subject of an article on the “colonial 
origins of international law”,162 the blackfriar became the key intellectual 
figure in a full monograph on the issue entitled Imperialism, Sovereignty and 
the Making of International Law, with that original article as its first chapter 
and theoretical foundation: 
Despite Vitoria’s significance as the first international legal jurist, the importance of 
his work has not been generally recognized as outlining, in clear and stark terms, the 
colonial origins of international law.163 
The central idea of the book is that both the invention and the universaliza-
tion of international law have been instrumental to an imperial expansion 
that subordinated non-European peoples to European powers and their 
interests. Underlying his grand new narrative is the contention that the 
history of the relationship between international law and colonial peoples 
cannot be properly analysed within the “traditional historiographical frame-
work”. Instead, this history “must recognize” the “underlying assumptions 
of its foundational texts”.164 This line of reasoning is of course appealing 
to those TWAIL scholars familiar with the post-modern critic’s work: “the 
further important issue is the question of whether it is possible to create an 
international law that is not imperial”.165 In consequence, some are adopt-
ing this approach. 
Bret Bowden, for example, has recently reiterated the idea of international 
law as an instrument of the “Western imperial project” in some major Eu-
ropean journals specialized in international law.166 In any case, the scholars 
161) Anghie, A. “Reading International Legal Texts: On the Indians lately discovered and 
sixteenth-century international law”, American Society of International Law Proceedings, April 
1-4 (1998): 375. 
162) Anghie, A. “Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law”, 5 Social 
& Legal Studies 3 (1996): 321-336.
163) Anghie, A. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, 2005, p. 9.
164) Anghie, A. “Reading … op. cit. p. 375.
165) Anghie, A. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making … op. cit. p. 317.
166) See Bowden, B. “The Colonial Origins of International Law: European Expansion and 
the Classical Standard of Civilisation”, 1 Journal of History of International Law 7 (2005): 
1-23. See also Bowden, B., 3 European Journal of International Law 17 (2006): 689-692. 
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from the other side of the Atlantic are the ones who seem most eager to 
push the argument even further. For Leslye Obiora, for example, Anghie’s 
thesis identifies the seminal works of Francisco de Vitoria as “a watershed 
that engendered juridical techniques and institutions manifestly appropri-
ated as license to live by plunder”. In her opinion, it copiously depicts “the 
chameleonic persistence of Vitorian epochs belied by rituals of innovation 
in the international legal framework”.167 
The traditional post-modern critique of international law (international 
law as a tool of imperialism/colonialism) is currently proposing an alternative 
history of international law. This approach basically sustains that interna-
tional law was an instrument of colonial oppression invented by Vitoria 
and others at the time of the Encounter of the New and Old World, and 
essentially continues to be so to the present day. However, in order to defend 
that conclusion, some standards of historiographical analysis have been 
abandoned. In addition, in selecting Vitoria, this literature seems to have 
chosen the wrong author.168 The blackfriar was among the first scholars to 
question the secular and spiritual legal instruments of dominion employed 
by the great powers of his time: Emperors and Popes. In doing so, he de-
veloped the ideas of the res publica of the whole world (as an overarching 
world political community called to bring together all peoples) and the law 
of peoples (as a set of shared rules regulating that community). In sum, by 
stretching his political and legal imagination, Francisco de Vitoria sketched 
the big idea of One World under a common set of rules. It is not difficult 
to argue that these ideas help to progressively rationalize social interaction 
on a worldwide scale.
167) Obiora, L. “Book review”, 40 Law and Society Review (2006): 729.
168) See Cavallar, G. “Vitoria, Grotius … op. cit. 184.
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